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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Russel Augustus ("Petitioner") was terminated from his job as a Vernal City

Equipment Operator II on March 21, 2016. Vernal City Manager Ken Bassett
("Bassett") effectuated the termination by issuing Petitioner a Notice of Disciplinary
Action, wherein four different reasons or policy violations were noted. Petitioner
appealed Bassett's decision to the Vernal City Appeals Board (the "Board"). The
appeal was made pursuant to Utah Code Section 10-3-1106 and Section 12.06.010
of the Vernal City Personnel Manual.
The Board listened to the appeal at a hearing, which was conducted on May
3, 2016. Testimony, evidence, and oral arguments were presented and received at .
the hearing. Additionally, written briefs were submitted to the Board on specific
subjects pertaining to the Petitioner's appeal. Upon deliberation, the Board affirmed
Vernal City's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment; and issued Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order on June 29, 2016.
The Board's decision to affirm Vernal City's termination of Petitioner's
employment has been appealed by Petitioner, and is ripe for review by this Court.
2.

Statement of Facts
For purposes of this brief, the Respondent, Vernal City accepts the factual

findings of the Board; and includes in this "Statement of Facts" those that it believes
to be the most pertinent parts of those factual findings.
On January 21, 2016 Petitioner, and Michael Leigh (Leigh)--another Vernal
City employee-- were assigned to place banners on poles on the west side of Vernal
City, under the direction of Jeff Gardner (R.10, R.418:4-R-419:18.) During the work
project, Petitioner and Leigh were operating a bucket truck owned by the city.
(R.419:21-22.)

Later in the morning, the bucket truck experienced mechanical problems and
was returned to Vernal City's motor pool for repairs. (R.11, R.419:23-R.420:12.)
While the bucket truck was being repaired, Petitioner drove a different city truck to
the 1500 East Yard; reportedly to check on the repair of a water line. (R.33,
R.420:25-R.421:1, R.474:7-10.)

Leigh accompanied Petitioner and rode as a

passenger in the truck. (R.420:25-R.421:1.) After lunch, Petitioner again took the
buckettruck, with Leigh, fueled it, and then proceeded down 500 North. (R.14-R15.)
Shortly after fueling the truck, Petitioner and Leigh deviated from their assigned
work project by turning South onto 1500 East in order to drive by the 1500 East
2

Yard. (R.24, R78-79, R.422:19.) Neither Gardner or the Superintendent of Vernal
City's Street Department, Mr. Allred ("Allred") gave Petitioner permission to depart
from the assignment of placing banners on the west side of the city. (R.422:13-19.)
Likewise, neither Petitioner's nor Leigh's work orders permitted them to divert city
equipment to the other side of town. (R.418:21-25.)
While driving the bucket truck past the 1500 East Yard, Petitioner further
deviated from his assigned work project by using his city subsidized cell phone to
take pictures/video record another city employee, BJ Partridge ("Partridge"). (R.79,
R.422:4-22, R.573:7-R.574:10.) Partridge was testing a piece of city equipment at

the 1500 East Yard, and was assigned to do so by Glade Allred. (R.20-21, R. 24.)
Petitioner recorded Partridge with the phone while simultaneously driving the
bucket truck. (R.266-67, R.370, R.422:4-12.)
Allred first learned of Petitioner's deviation from his assigned work from a
report made by Partridge. (R.422:4-12.). Partridge explained he had seen Petitioner
and Leigh atthe 1500 East Yard. (R.422:4-12.). Partridge told Allred that Petitioner
had used his cell phone to video record or to take pictures of him performing his
work project. (R-422:4-12.) Allred decided to investigated the matter further by
conducting interviews with Leigh and Petitioner. (R.6-42, R.44-69.)
Allred first met with Leigh. (R-42, R.427:7-9.) Allred asked Leigh a series of
questions relating to Leigh's and Petitioner's actions and whereabouts on January
21. (R.6-42.) During the interview, Leigh stated to Allred that after refueling the
3

bucket truck he and Petitioner returned to the 1500 East Yard. (R.15.) He also
admitted to Allred that while they were at the yard Petitioner used his cell phone to
take pictures of Partridge operating a piece of city equipment. (R.16-17.) At the end
of the meeting Allred placed Leigh on paid vacation leave, and told Leigh that he was
going to get to the bottom of what occurred, and to call in the early morning to know
whether or not to report for work the next day. (R. 36, R. 42, R.555.) .
Allred next interviewed Petitioner. (R.426:12-R. 427:9.) Prior to the interview,
Allred made three unsuccessful attempts to get in contact with Petitioner.
(R-424:17-R.425:23.) First he attempted to reach Petitioner over the radio, but was
unsuccessful due to an apparent malfunction.

(R.423:8-R.424:20.) He then

attempted twice to contact Petitioner on Petitioner's employer issued work phone.
(R. 425:2-R.426:1.) These attempts too were of no avail. (R-426:2-4.) Ultimately,
Allred reached Petitioner by running into him at the City's Public Works yard; at
which time Allred explained to Petitioner that they needed to meet.
(R:426: 12-R.427:9.)
The interview with Petitioner took place at about 3:30pm. (R.427:7-9.)
Throughout the course of the interview, Petitioner consistently exhibited an
uncooperative, evasive and insubordinate attitude. (R.427:11-22.) This attitude was
apparent from both his communications with Allred as well as his general demeanor.
(R.43, R.44-69, R.427:11--R:431:10, R-443:9-22, R.696:9-R.697:7.) When Allred
inquired as to why Petitioner did not answer his cell phone Petitioner stated that he
4

didn't have his cell phone, that his phone had been turned off all day, and that he
didn't know where it was. (R.44, R. 68, R.426:25-R.427:4.) Despite this contention,
it was later discovered that Petitioner had in fact used his phone three times that
morning. (R.167, R.411:14-R.412:14, R-466:15-R-467:4.)
After questioning Petitioner about his failure to answer his phone, Allred
proceeded to ask a series of questions about Petitioner's work activities on January
21, 2017, particularly about driving down to the 1500 East Yard and taking pictures
of Partridge. (R.44-R.69.) Allred later reported that during this line of questi9ning
Petitioner's answers became "very elusive and very vague". (R.443:9-20.) During the
interview, Petitioner adamantly maintained that he could not remember ifhe had
driven by the 1500 East Yard. (R.58, R.61, R.63, R.65, R.430:10-15, R.443:9-12.).
Despite his lack of memory concerning this particular event, Petitioner had little to
no difficulty recalling his whereabouts and activities earlier that same day. (R.53,
R.55-57, R.65.) In a subsequent administrative proceeding, however, Petitioner
admitted to driving back to the 1500 East Yard and taking pictures of Partridge.
(R.570:9-18.)
Allred also questioned Petitioner about taking pictures/making a video
recording of Partridge. (R.65-R.66, R.68, R.430.) During this line of questioning
Petitioner's again gave answers that were vague or evasive. (R.65, R.443.) Initially,
during the interview with Allred, Petitioner feigned lack of memory as to the
existence of the cell phone pictures/video. (R. 65-66, R.68.) Later, during the
5

hearing before the Board, Petitioner testified that he had in fact made a recording on
his phone in order to document what he perceived as a safety concern with Partridge
operating city equipment. (R.573:10-R.574:15, R.600:12-16.) However, the video
was never turned over by Petitioner to city administration for review, and was viewed
by city officials for the first time at the Board hearing. (R.574:22-23, R.600:12-21.)
Allred also asked several times during the interview for Petitioner to make his
phone available; so that he could check it for pictures and/or video. (R.66-67,
R.444:17-21.) Allred reminded Petitioner that Petitioner signed an agreement with
Vernal City that required him to make information on his phone available to the City
upon request. (R.66; R.43019-23; See R. 71,72, R.73, R.177.) Petitioner was
uncooperative with this request. (R.66-67, R.430:23-R.431-3.) Ultimately, Petitioner
got defensive and refused to hand over his phone stating, "[y]ou're not touching my
phone, [Allred]". (R.66, R.444.)
Around 4:00pm the investigative interview came to a premature end when
Petitioner indicated to Allred that his work shift was over and that he was going to
leave. (R.68, R.431:3.) Allred explained to Petitioner that he couldn't leave until he
was finished asking questions. (R.68, R.431:2-10.) Allred admonished Petitioner
that leaving the meeting was insubordination, and that he would be placing himself
at risk of administrative action, up to and including possible termination. (R.69,
R-431:7-9.) In direct opposition to his supervisor's authority, Petitioner left the
interview. (R.431:9-10.)

As he was leaving, and in response to Allred's
6
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admonishment, Petitioner retorted, "Have fun with that." (R.69, R.431:10.)
After the interview, Allred, in accordance with city policy, placed Petitioner
on paid vacation. (R. 712:13-21.) Later that evening, upon further investigation and
reflection, Allred determined that it was in the best interest of the City that both
Petitioner and Leigh not be permitted to return to work before the first of next week.
(R.340, R.709:16-19.) Allred later testified that the City's interest was allowing City
administrator's additional time to investigate Petitioner's suspected employee policy
violations, while also allowing Petitioner time to cool off. (R.711:21-R.712:7,
R.713:3-7.) Petitioner remained off duty on paid vacation leave until January 29,

2017, at which time City Manager Basset placed him on administrative leave. (R.3.)
A pre-disciplinary hearing was held on March 4, 2016. (R.74.) Petitioner was
given notice of the pre-disciplinary hearing on J anua:ry 29, 2016. (R.1-4.) The notice
contained four reasons for potential disciplinary action against Petitioner, all of
which pertained to the January 21 incident, and Petitioner's behavior during his
interview with Allred. (R.1.) The four reasons were as follows:
(1)

Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties;

misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property of any
employee; and deliberately restricting output;
(2)

Act of Dishonesty related to job performance;

(3)

Displaying insubordinate behavior; and

(4)

A [v]iolation of ... City Personnel Policies or Procedures, ... (Not
7

having your cell phone available as required by the cellphone use agreement dated
April 22, 2103) and cell phone policy of the City; and 12.05.030 (W) Act of
Dishonesty related to job performance.
(R.1.)

Petitioner was present at the pre-disciplinary hearing along with his attorney,
Christian Kesselring. (R.74.) The Citywas represented by Mike Harrington. (R.74.)
During the hearing witnesses testified and Petitioner had an opportunity to present
his response to the issues raised bythepre-disciplinaryhearingnotice. (R.74-R.110.)
On March 21, 2016, following the hearing, City Manager Bassett issued a Notice of
Disciplinary Action to Petitioner, terminating his employment with Vernal City.
(R.179-R.184.) The Notice of Disciplinary Action identified specific misconduct by
Petitioner which justified his termination. (R.180-R.183.)
Regarding reason (1), "Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform
assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property
of any employee; deliberately restricting output", the Notice specified that Petitioner
failed to satisfactorily perform his duties when he decided to deviate from his
assigned work project and go to the 1500 East yard and take pictures of Partridge.
(R.180-R.181.) In addition, he used the bucket truck for a purpose that was
unrelated to his job duties. (R.180-R.181.) Finally, Petitioner's deliberate act of
taking Leigh away from his duties to ride to the 1500 East yard deliberately
restricted work output. (R.180-R.181.)
8

Regarding reason (2) "Dishonesty related to job performance", the Notice
specified that termination was warranted because, based on testimony, Petitioner
was disingenuous when he told Allred that he couldn't remember going to the 1500
East yard or taking photographs or videos. (R.181.)
Regarding reason (3) "Insubordination", the Notice specified that termination
was warranted because Petitioner left the January 25th meeting after being directed
to stay, and being admonished that leaving would constitute insubordination.
(R.182.)

Finally, regarding reason (4) "Violation of city personnel policies or
procedures" the Notice specified that termination was warranted because Petitioner
did not have his cell phone available as required by the cell phone use agreement
dated April 22, 2013, the cell phone policy of the City, and also for not answering
Allred's calls. (R.182-R.183.) Additionally, Petitioner lied about having access to his
cell phone when he stated twice "I haven't had my cell phone," and "my phone has
been off all day", when in reality he had used it earlier that day while on duty.
(R.182-R.183.)
The decision to terminate Petitioner's employment was subsequently
re-examined in a hearing before the Board.

(R.386-R.773.)

Petitioner was

represented by counsel during the hearing and so was Vernal City. (R.392:1-13.)
During the hearing, the Board heard the testimony of witnesses and reviewed
exhibits and other pieces of evidence. (R.386-R. 773.) In addition, counsel submitted
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briefs on specific issues raised at the hearing. (R. 771; See R.374-376.). The primary
issues that required briefing were; (i) whether the meeting between Allred and
Petitioner was a disciplinary proceeding, requiring due process before requiring
Petitioner to take paid vacation, and; (ii) if it was not a disciplinary proceeding, did
Allred act with lawful authority in requiring Petitioner to stay in the January 25th
meeting. (R.771; See R.374-376.).
'-.JJI

Upon deliberation, the Board unanimously affirmed Vernal City's decision
to terminate Petitioner's employment. (R.380-381.). In support of its decision, the
Board made detailed findings with regards to each of the four reasons for
termination, and the issues presented by counsel in their briefs. (R.368-377.)
Concerning reason (1) "Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform
assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or damaging any city property, or the property
of any employee; deliberately restricting output" the Board found and concluded in
pertinent part as follows:
1.

On January 21, 2016 [Petitioner] was assigned to place banners on poles

on the west side of the city ...

3.

After lunch [Petitioner] took the bucket truck with Mr. Michael Leigh,

... and then proceeded down 500 North, turning South on 1500 East to pass by the
1500

East Yard .... There is no evidence that Mr. Gardner or Mr. Allred approved

diverting equipment and personnel from the west side of town to the east side of
IO

town.
4.

[The] real reason for the diversion was that the [Petitioner] desired to

drive by the 1500 East Yard to video another city employee ...
5.

The video was taken using [Petitioner's] cell phone, which is a city

subsidized cell phone, and as such is subject to city cell phone policy.
6.

It appears from the video that [Petitioner] introduced at the hearing,

that [he] was driving the city bucket truck while videoing with his cell phone, which
is an unsafe and illegal practice. During the meeting between Petitioner and Mr.
Allred on January 25, Petitioner refused to answer questions about where he took the
bucket truck after lunch and claimed several times that he returned to the west side
of the city to work on banners as he had been assigned. In subsequent proceedings,
[Petitioner] admitted that this was not true.

9.

Petitioner's claims about the reason for his taking the video lack

credibility for at least the following reasons:
a.

If he was concerned about safety of persons or equipment he

should have immediately provided the video to Mr. Allred or to Allen Parker or Ken
Bassett, which he did not do and in fact refused to provide the video;
b.

He was evasive and untruthful about having taken the video, and

the purposes of the video; it appears from the video that was provided that he was
driving by the yard while taking the video rather than stopping in a safe manner to
11

take the video and reporting his concerns immediately to appropriate city officials;
c.

He failed and refused to provide the video to his supervisor when

directly requested to do so, and claimed during the meeting that he did not have his
cell phone and did not know where it was, which is a violation of city policy.

[Petitioner's] conduct wasted city resources and placed the city at risk

12.

and was contrary to his assigned work area.
(R.368-370.)
Concerning reason (2), "Dishonesty related to job performance", the Board
found and concluded in pertinent part as follows:
1.

[Petitioner] was dishonest in his statements and explanations

concerning his activities on January 21, 2015, including the reason for taking the city
bucket truck and another city employee to 1500 East and in his stated reasons for
videoing Mr. Partridge.
2.

[Petitioner] refused to acknowledge videoing a fellow city employee

operating a piece of city equipment, was evasive, and avoided or refused to answer
direct questions concerning the incident.
3.

[Petitioner] stated that he would provide a copy of the video when he

finally acknowledged that he had it, which he failed to do.
4.

[Petitioner] falsely stated that his concern was the safety of an employee

or equipment which, ... lacks any credibility.
12

5.

At the hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board observed Petitioner,

both while he was testifying and when he was not testifying, and finds that his
answers to questions propounded by the attorney for the city were evasive, that his
demeanor evidenced lack of truthfulness, and that based upon his actions and
statements in the recorded conversation with his supervisor and his testimony at the
hearing it is difficult to afford any degree of credibility to the statements made by
[Petitioner].
6.

[There] is substantial evidence to support the finding that [Petitioner]

was dishonest:
a.

[Petitioner] stated that he could not remember or had not gone

by the 1500 East Yard;
b.

[Petitioner] claimed that he had returned to work putting up

banners on the west side of the city, traveling along 100 North;
c.

[Petitioner] claimed that he did not have his telephone when Mr.

Allred attempted to contact him on January 25;
d.

[Petitioner] stated that his purpose in going by the 1500 East yard

was solely to fix banners on the East side of the city.
e.

When questioned during his meeting with his supervisor and at

the hearing about matters that he did not want to admit to or discuss, Petitioner was
deceptive and claimed he couldn't remember, yet on the same dates he appeared to
have a very vivid recollection when it served his interests;
13

g.

Petitioner changed his story repeatedly, and omitted facts and

feigned lack of memory. Petitioner also made misleading statements about his use
of city equipment and about the video, and made dishonest statements about taking
the video and about the purpose of the video.
(R.370-371.)

Concerning reason (3) "Insubordination" the Board found and concluded as
follows:
1.

There [was] more than substantial evidence to show that [Petitioner]

was insubordinate throughout the meeting with his supervisor.
2.

[Petitioner's] general tone of voice, attitude, tapping of a marker on the

table, and refusal and failure to answer questions honestly and directly demonstrated
a lack of respect for his supervisor.
3.

[Petitioner] was evasive, refused to answer questions, was disrespectful,

ordered the supervisor to 'move on' after evading questions, cursed, and ultimately
walked out of the meeting after being specifically and clearly directed by his
supervisor to remain in the meeting. Moreover, he did walk out after being advised
that refusal to remain in the meeting would be considered insubordination and may
result in his termination.
4.

[Ausugusts'] disrespectful retort as he left the meeting 'good luck with

that' further illustrates a series of disrespectful and insubordinate statements and
14

conduct by [Petitioner] during that meeting toward his supervisor, which is
illustrated to some degree by the transcript but more forcefully by the audio
recording of the meeting.
5.

The Board is convinced that the purpose of [Petitioner's] video on the

east side of the city on January 21, when he was assigned to work on the west side of
the city, was not motivated by a safety concern but rather was an effort to undermine
and get information to damage his department head.
6.

Petitioner's attitude during the meeting with Mr. Allred was

insubordinate, confrontational, dishonest, and disrespectful.
7.

At no time following that meeting did [Petitioner] make any effort to

apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any willingness or desire to work
cooperatively with his supervisor or make any effort to resolve any concerns or
differences.
8.

Had [Petitioner's] attitude following that meeting up to and through the

hearing before the Board been different or more cooperative or upfront and honest
the result might well have been different. Instead [Petitioner] has remained defiant,
aggressive and dishonest.
9.

In the meeting with Mr.Allred, [Petitioner] was requested at least twice

to provide a copy of the video that he took while driving the city truck, yet he did not
provide that until played for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals Board.
During his testimony before the Appeals Board he claimed no one asked for the video
15

which is a clear act of dishonesty and false statement under oath before the Appeals
Board, as shown by the audio recording and transcription of that meeting.
10.

From all of the evidence, including the transcripts and recording of the

interview with his supervisor through the hearing before the Appeals Board, the
Board finds that Petitioner's actions have been targeted towards undermining his
supervisor so that he could take over the Department.
11.

Petitioner's statements about his not having his phone available when

his supervisor was attempting to contact him are untruthful and also insubordinate.
It is clear that he had his telephone available since he made use of it, yet he failed to
answer calls from his supervisor or to return calls that had been made to him.
12.

[Petitioner] was untruthful in claiming that his texts with Sherri

Montgomery were during his break since the time line of those texts demonstrates
a period in excess of a normal break.
13.

[Petitioner] is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing to admit his

activities, lying about his activities, and failing to acknowledge his fault and
misconduct when he made a mistake. His attitude throughout has been to cast
blame on others but not to take any responsibility himself.
14.

The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only demonstrated by the

transcripts and recordings prior to the hearing, but the Board notes, his facial
expressions, demeanor and behavior at the hearing when answering questions
regarding the events and during the testimony of Mr. Allred including smirking,
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rolling his eyes and other conduct and expressions further confirms a lack of respect
and an insubordinate attitude.

15.

A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect was also

demonstrated and observed by the Board during the hearing. During the testimony
of Mr. Bassett, Petitioner was observed to glare at the witness and rolled his eyes,
and acted in a hostile and disrespectful manner.
16.

The Vernal City Road Department is a fairly small department with a

limited number of employees. The actions of Petitioner show that he is not amenable
to supervision and cannot work there under the direction of the department head,
Mr. Allred. This results in part from his insubordination and his dishonesty in
dealing with his department head and with others and from the fact that he has not
made any effort to resolve the issues or acknowledge his misconduct. Even at the
hearing it was apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful attitude, and has no
willingness to acknowledge his own errors. Any discipline less than termination
would not bring about needed change ...
(R.371-373.)
Concerning reason (4), "Violation of city personnel policies or procedures,
including the cell phone policy", the Board found and concluded in pertinent part as
follows:
1.

There is substantial evidence that [Petitioner] violated the City's cell

phone policies and procedures as indicated in the Notice of Disciplinary Action ...
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The City Manager did not abuse his discretion in finding violations of the personnel
policies including cell phone policy.
(R.373-374.)
Finally, concerning the issues raised in counsels' brief to the Board, the Board
made the following general findings:
1.

A supervisor has the right and the responsibility to look into concerns

that arise about an employee and to investigate. That investigation may include
interviewing or questioning the employee or other witnesses. Such a meeting is part
of the supervisory responsibility of the supervisor or department head, and is not a
pre-discipline hearing, even if the supervisor has outlined a list of questions or issues
of concern priorto the meeting. Meeting with [Petitioner] to give him an opportunity
to explain what had transpired on January 21 was proper ...
2.

According to [Petitioner's] brief both Mr. Leigh and Petitioner were

questioned by their supervisor on January 25th about the same incidents and both
were instructed to take some paid vacation time. Apparently Mr. Leigh responded
differently to the meeting with his supervisor than Petitioner such that he was not
terminated. As outlined above, Petitioner's attitude and behavior took him down an
entirely different road.
The Board then went into detailed findings regarding the two primary issues
argued in the parties' briefs.
4. Authority to Issue Order.
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a. [Petitioner] has not provided any substantial evidence that Mr. Allred did
not have proper authority to direct him to remain at the meeting. It is within the
inherent authority of a supervisor to inquire into issues of concern relating to an
employee and to request information from the employee as part of that process. The
nature of the work for which [Petitioner] is employed frequently requires work
beyond a specific quitting time.

c. [Allred] did not order Petitioner to remain in the meeting for the purpose
of providing "a foot massage" but rather in an attempt to pierce the intransigent
refusal of [Petitioner] to honestly and directly answer questions propounded by his
supervisor.
d. The Board believes that is a proper exercise of supervisory responsibility
and authority.
5. Paid Vacation Time.

a. Testimony at the hearing shows that the policy and long-standing practice
at the city has been that department heads may, under appropriate circumstances,
require an employee to take several days of vacation. This may be to allow the
employee to deal with personal issues, or it may be to allow an employee time to cool
off or settle down. That is paid time off. The direction to Petitioner to take vacation
time was consistent with that policy and practice. In light of the behavior and
attitude of the Appellant, Petitioner, the direction to take some paid vacation time
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was advisable, and was not an abuse of discretion nor did it exceed the authority of
the supervisor.
b. The application and imposition of paid vacation time was allowed pursuant
to city policies section 5.01.010 and action 5.01.060, including the provision that "as
he deems necessary, a department head may require an employee to use any accrued
vacation leave." The application and interpretation of that policy by the department
head and the city manager is consistent with long-standing application and
interpretation of that policy, and [Petitioner] did not present any substantial
evidence to the contrary.
Finally, the Board revisited the issue of insubordination by making additional
findings which supported the Board's previous conclusion that Petitioner was
properly terminated for insubordination. Many of these findings also address the
Boards' perception of Petitioner's credibility as a witness.
a. The Board finds that Petitioner's behavior, statements, and actions
demonstrate that when he ignored the directions to help finish installing banners on
the west side of the city and instead drove the city bucket truck and another city
employee to the east side of the city and passed the yard while taking video with his
city subsidized phone, his intent was to undermine his department head, Mr. Allred.

The video that he took of another employee operating the city equipment, which was
provided for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals Board demonstrates that
he was unsafely operating the city bucket truck by videoing while driving, and it
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appears that he had planned in advance to take the video and had manipulated his
phone while driving and prior to reaching the yard.

c. In fact, Petitioner went out of his way to avoid admitting that he had taken
the video during his meeting with his supervisor and failed and refused in spite of
repeated requests to provide the video taken on the city subsidized cell phone. In so
doing he violated city policy and contradicted any argument that he undertook that
activity for a legitimate purpose. When interviewed days later aboutthe events on the
day that Petitioner took the video with his cell phone, he claimed no memory of that
particular event but had good recall of the other events of that same day. If he had
a legitimate concern about safety issues, it is not credible to believe that he would
remember other insignificant events of the day but lack recall as to that matter.
d. During the interview with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was evasive and
defensive and aggressive when questioned on those matters.
e. During his testimony before the hearing Board when questioned by
opposing counsel about those matters he once again reacted in an evasive,
confrontational manner.

g. The events from January 21, 2016, and the attitude and behavior of the
Appellant from that time through the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing
demonstrate more interest in undermining his supervisor and no evidence
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whatsoever of any effort or desire to work cooperatively within the Department
structure or chain of command.
h. The Appellant's attitude, nonverbal displays, and facial expressions during
the hearing on the stand were disturbing and pronounced and reflect an attitude,
disrespect, and a disregard for truth.
i. The Appellant's statement as he left the meeting with his supervisor in
blatant disregard of the instruction that he remain at the meeting - the comment
"good luck with that" - is consistent with the attitude and actions displayed at the
evidentiary hearing before the Board. The "good luck with that" attitude which
remains unchanged shows that he cannot work effectively under the supervision of
the road department head, and that his continuing presence there and insolent
attitude would be disruptive to the good order and efficient operation of the entire
department.
j. Had the Appellant at any time prior to the pre-disciplinary hearing or even
during the evidentiary hearing demonstrated through his words and demeanor and
behavior any change of attitude, recognition of his misconduct, any desire to mend
fences and work cooperatively with his supervisor and within the structure of the
department as a positive productive employee the outcome might well be different.
(R.374-376.)

Based on these findings, the Board concluded that Vernal City' decision to
terminate Petitioner was supported by the weight of the evidence; that Allred
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exercised appropriate supervisory authority, and that City Manager Bassett did not
abuse his discretion or act in a arbitrary or capricious manner in deciding to
terminate Petitioner's employment. (R.378-380.) Thus, the unanimous decision of
the Board was that termination of Petitioner was warranted, and the order to
terminate Petitioner's employment was sustained. (R.381.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner's initial argument is that Petitioner's supervisor allegedly violated
the law in his meeting with Petitioner to investigate wrongdoings on Petitioner's
part. This argument does not have any basis in law or fact. Petitioner's other
argument is that the decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed because the
Appeals Board allegedly considered facts outside the scope of the Notice of
Disciplinary Action.

This argument should also fail because the argument is

inadequately briefed, the Appeals Board considered only matters sufficiently related
to the several bases for termination described in the Notice of Disciplinary Action,
and/ or any error on the part of the Appeals Board was harmless error as the decision
of the Appeals Board was supported by substantial evidence. In the end, Petitioner's
termination should be upheld because the Vernal City Appeals Board did not abuse
its discretion in upholding the City Manager's decision to terminate Petitioner.
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ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER'S SUPERVISOR ACTED WITHIN APPROPRIATE
AUTHORITY DURING HIS INTERACTION WITH PETITIONER AT THE
JANUARY 25, 2016 MEETING.
When Petitioner's supervisorwith Vernal City(GladeAllred, hereafter referred
to as the "Supervisor") had become aware of Petitioner's possible violations ofVernal
City policy, the Supervisor called a meeting with Petitioner to discuss the concerns
and investigate the matter. Upon meeting with Petitioner to review the allegations
of misconduct, and finding Petitioner to be extremely angry and aggressive, the
supervisor decided to place Petitioner on paid leave in order to allow Petitioner to
calm down from his irate state of mind so that he could return to work mentally
healthy and productive, which decision was appropriate and cannot constitute
formal discipline.

Regardless, Petitioner's insubordinate behavior during the

meeting cannot be simply ignored because of an alleged due process violation.

A.

The Supervisor's Decision to Place Petitioner on Paid Vacation Was
Appropriate and Cannot Constitute Formal Discipline.
1.

The purpose of the January 25 meeting was investigatory rather than
disciplinary.

Under Section 12.05.040 of the Vernal City Personnel Manual, formal
proceedings for discipline are to take place only after the Department Head and the
City Manager have met to discuss the matter of alleged employee misconduct. Such
an event prior to formal discipline implies a requirement for the Department Head
to investigate any alleged matter of employee misconduct before consulting with the
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City Manager. As such, before meeting with the City Manager, the Department Head
is tasked with interviewing witnesses to alleged misconduct as well as reviewing any
available documentation associated with the alleged misconduct. Additionally, there
is nothing in the Vernal City Personnel Manual that in any way prohibits the
Department Head from conducting such an investigation of alleged misconduct. If
the Department Head and the City Manager so decide, based on the facts discovered
by the Department Head, formal discipline may proceed in accordance with the
Personnel Manual. Id.
In this case, the Supervisor, a department head within Vernal City, had
received allegations of misconduct against Petitioner Russel Augustus, an employee
of Vernal City under Mr. Allred's supervision. As seen from the findings of the
Appeals Board, which considered among other things the transcript of the January
25 meeting, the audio recording of the meeting, and the testimony at the appeals

hearing, nothing within the meeting at issue was anything more than a supervisor
lawfully acting as the department head to investigate the allegations against an
employee. The Appeals Board specifically found, "The meeting between Mr. Allred
and Mr. Augustus was an appropriate exercise of supervisory responsibility by Mr.
Allred and did not require the formalities appropriate for a predisciplinary hearing."
R.379.
2.

The City is allowed to place employees on paid vacation in order to
establish a healthy and productive work force.
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Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.010 states, "The purpose of annual
vacation leave is to allow an employee time to both mentally and physically refresh
himself in order that he be better able to carry out the duties of his work." There is
nothing in the policy that implies that vacation is only to be taken when the
employee chooses. In fact, under the section dealing with scheduling vacation leave,
Section 5.01.060, it states, "As he deems necessary, a Department Head may require
an employee to use any accrued vacation leave."

Furthermore, under Vernal City

Personnel Manual Section 12.05.065, a requested use of vacation time is not
classified as a disciplinary action, nor is such a request discussed at any place in the
Personnel Manual in the context of discipline.
After the meeting took place between Petitioner and his supervisor, on the
afternoon of January 25, 2016, the supervisor requested Petitioner to leave work and
to use Petitioner's vacation time in the process. At the hearing before the Appeals
Board, testimony was presented that Petitioner had become "heated" and unable to
behave properly or carry out the duties of his work, thereby making it necessary to
mentally and physically refresh himself.

R.427-431, 4 73.

Furthermore, the

supervisor used his discretion as a department head, as given him under Vernal City
policy described above, when making that request.
3.

The request to use vacation time was not formal discipline.

Under Vernal City policy described above, and according to testimony given, the
order was not disciplinary in nature, but rather with any eye toward rehabilitating
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an employee while Vernal City administration considered an appropriate course of
action. There is no Utah law contradicting these Vernal City policies. Therefore, the
meeting was lawful, and was not disciplinary in nature.
There is no evidence that any specific discipline had been decided ahead of
time. As testified by the Supervisor, any notes prepared beforehand were the
supervisor's attempt to prepare for possible avenues of action after the interviewing
the witnesses and reviewing supporting documentation. R.698. He was merely
making notes regarding his options when he listed a possibility of "No paid time."
Furthermore, a plain reading of that phrase has nothing to do with paid vacation.
4.

The issue of whether Petitioner's supervisor could lawfully request that
Petitioner stay at the January 25 meeting was not adequately briefed.

The title of Section

1

of Petitioner's Brief asserts, "The Appeals Board

committed reversible error when it concluded that Petitioner's supervisor acted
within his authority by ordering Petitioner to stay in the January 25 meeting."
Petitioner's Brief at p. 20. Outside of this very general statement, Petitioner fails to
present any discussion whatsoever in support of the argument that the supervisor
lacked lawful authority to request that Petitioner remain in the investigatory
meeting. Petitioner only makes the argument that the meeting with the supervisor
was an unlawful predisciplinary hearing in nature, without any argument as to why
that circumstance would prevent a supervisor from demanding that his employee
remain in that meeting, which by all accounts was still a business-related meeting
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requested by the supervisor. See, generally, Petitioner's Brief at Section 1, pp. 20-26.
Therefore, the issue of whether or not Petitioner's supervisor had lawful authority
to make such a request to stay is not at issue and does not need to be addressed.
Furthermore, Petitioner requests in his "Conclusion" that the Court remand
this matter to determine whether termination was warranted, but to make that
determination "in the absence of insubordination," and hinges that request on the
argument that if the supervisor lacked authority to demand that Petitioner not leave
the meeting, then it cannot be insubordination to have done so.
Brief at pp.

20-21, 28.

See Petitioner's

Therefore, where Petitioner's Brief is bereft of discussion or

argument regarding the supervisor's authority to demand that Petitioner stay, the
Court should accept the Appeal Board's determination that Petitioner's leaving the
meeting against the request of his supervisor was an act of insubordination. But as
discussed below, even if the January 25 meeting is in some way found to be
inappropriate in nature, that does not excuse Petitioner's behavior during the
meeting.

B.

Petitioner Was Insubordinate During the January 25 Meeting,
Which Behavior Cannot Be Excused Regardless of "Whether
Directed Paid Vacation Is Considered Disciplinary in Nature.
1.

Petitioner was insubordinate.

It is undisputed that insubordination is a terminable offense under Vernal City

policy and Utah State law.

Respondents accept Petitioner's definition of

insubordination as one possible demonstration of insubordinate behavior that is
28

worthy of formal discipline; Respondents agree that an employee may not disobey
a reasonable and lawfully-given direction from a superior.
Utah law includes some additional direction as to what may constitute
insubordination. Under the administrative code describing examples of just cause
bases for discharge of employment, it addresses insubordination as follows:
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be

followed; reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be
obeyed; supervisors will be respected and their authority will not be
undermined. In determining when insubordination becomes
disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and
legitimate interests is of major importance. Protesting or expressing
general dissatisfaction without an overt act is not a disregard of the
employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a superior or
vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may constitute
insubordination if it disrupts routine, undermines authority or impairs
efficiency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic insistence or discussion by
a claimant, acting in good faith, is not disqualifying conduct.
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208; see also Dinger v. Department of Workforce
Services, Workforce Appeals Bd., 2013 UT App 59, ,I16, 300 P.3d 313 .1

Additionally, as Petitioner has pointed out, Vernal City has not defined the
term "insubordination" within its policies. It follows that the City Manager and the
Vernal City Appeals Board should be given broad discretion to identify acts of
insubordination within the common usage of the word.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Utah case law supports the notion that
'Though this is in the context of just cause termination which would deny a terminated
employee of unemployment insurance funds, the policies outlined by Code function as a
persuasive description of how allegations of insubordination should be analyzed in all State
employment contexts.
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termination may be appropriate in the case of insubordination. See, generally,
Dinger, 2013 UT App 59, 300 P.3d 313; Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App 51,
230 P.3d 1032.

In this case it is undisputed that during the January 25 meeting between
Petitioner and his supervisor, Petitioner was gently instructed not to leave the
meeting, and that leaving would constitute insubordination. The supervisor's
instruction was lawful. Petitioner instead walked out, casually disrespecting the
supervisor's threat of discipline, retorting, "Good luck with that."
2.

Even if, arquendo, Petitioner's supervisor's direction to take paid
vacation transformed the January 25 meeting into an unlawful
disciplinary hearing, Petitioner had no right to act insubordinately.

As described above, Respondents assert that the January 25 meeting was
appropriately held and Petitioner's supervisor acted within appropriate authority.
However, even if this Court determines that the meeting was disciplinary in nature,
that cannot excuse Petitioner's insubordinate behavior.
Petitioner's argument is essentially that Petitioner's outrageous behavior
toward his superior should be excused because the meeting itself resulted in an
allegedly unlawful disciplinary hearing. However, an employee's insubordinate
behavior toward a superior may not be overlooked because of a technical reading of
vacation policy. Even if the supervisor had actually unlawfully issued disciplinary
measures to Petitioner during the January 25 meeting, there is nothing in the law
that would allow Petitioner to leave a properly called business-related meeting
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against his superior's requests that he remain. The instruction to remain and discuss
the allegations was reasonable. The supervisor's requests were given civilly and
respectfully. The supervisor had a rightful and legitimate authority to investigate the
matter without Petitioner leaving the meeting.
Furthermore, and in contrast, Petitioner did not have the right to act in the
manner in which he conducted himself at the meeting. As presented at the hearing,
he was disrespectful, undermining, and provoking. Therefore, even if the ordered
leave on paid vacation was unlawful to any degree, Petitioner's insubordinate
behavior, particularly in leaving the meeting, was not excusable.
II. THE APPEAIS BOARD COMMITIED NO DUE PROCESS ERROR IN
ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN FAVOR OF

DISCIPLINARY ACTION.
A.

Petitioner's Argument That the Appeals Board Considered
Evidence Outside the Scope of the Notice of Disciplinary Action Is
Inadequately Briefed.
" [T]o be adequate, briefs must provide meaningful legal analysis. An adequate

brief is one that fully identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal
authority. Mere bald citation to authority, devoid of any analysis, is not adequate.
And we may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." State v.
Lee,

2006

UT 5, ,I

22, 128

P.3d 1179 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). In his brief at part 2, Petitioner makes
a general allegation that the Appeals Board relied on evidence outside the scope of
the Notice of Disciplinary Action in justifying Petitioner's termination. However,
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Petitioner sites to no specific instances of misconduct, alleged to have been
considered by the Appeals Board, that are outside the Notice of Disciplinary Action.
Petitioner's brief merely cites to authority and contains no meaningful analysis of
how that authority applies to the case at hand, making it impossible for Respondent
herein to be able to fully respond to the argument. Furthermore, in part 2.3 of his
brief, Petitioner makes another general allegation that Petitioner was harmed by
being deprived of a fair hearing and that the entire process was biased against him,
again without citing to any specific instances of due process violations, and failing
to cite to any law. Therefore, part 2 of Petitioner's brief is inadequately briefed, and
therefore should not be considered by this Court.
The response below is Respondent's best attempt to discern Petitioner's
argument and demonstrate that the argument should fail regardless.

B.

Petitioner Was Given Adequate Notice ofthe Bases for Termination
Prior to the Hearing Before the Appeals Board, and the Appeals
Board Relied on Those Bases in Upholding Petitioner's
Termination.
"The statutory scheme that describes the process for appealing a termination

decision to a municipal appeal board requires that the city provide notice of the
grounds for termination so that an employee can meaningfully evaluate whether an
appeal is likely to be productive and what information will be considered by the
board." Fierro v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2012 UT App 304, ,i 13, 295 P.3d 696.
Inherent in this statement is that due process requires only general notice of the
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factual allegations and legal theories underlying the formal discipline, and not every
detail and aspect of the facts and law. General notice of the facts and resulting
violations is sufficient to allow a "meaningful" evaluation by the employee as to
whether to appeal.
Respondent Vernal City, in its Notice of Disciplinary Action, notified
Petitioner of several violations of City policy (specifically citing to lettered
subsections within section 12.05.030 of the Vernal City Personnel Manual, entitled
"Causes for Disciplinary Action") which formed the basis of the City Manager's
decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The violations are summarized as
follows:
1.

On January

21, 2016,

failing to satisfactorily perform duties when

Petitioner decided to ignore his assigned task and instead go to another location to
take photos of another employee, in violation of subsection (D) (inefficiency or
inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties).
2.

On January 21, 2016, using the City's bucket truck for a purpose unrelated

to his job duties, in violation of subsection (M) (misusing any City property).
3.

On January 21, 2016, taking another employee away from that employee's

assigned duties, in violation of subsection (N) (deliberately restricting employee
output).
4. On January 25, 2016, dishonesty in Petitioner telling his supervisor that he
could not remember the events of January 21, 2016, when in fact he could remember,
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in violation of subsection (W) (an act of dishonesty related to job performance).
5. On January 25, 2016, displaying insubordinate behavior in leaving a
meeting between Petitioner and his supervisor after being told to stay, and after
being informed that leaving would constitute insubordination and grounds for
discipline, in violation of subsection (AA) (displaying insubordinate behavior).
6.

On January 25, 2016, Petitioner not having his cell phone available as

required by agreement with the City, and choosing not to answer the supervisor's
phone calls, in violation of subsection (A) (a violation of any of the City Personnel
Policies).
7. On January 25, 2016, Petitioner's dishonesty in stating multiple times that
he did not have his cell phone on him and that the cell phone had been turned off,
in violation of subsection (W) (an act of dishonesty related to job performance).
The allegations contained in the Notice of Disciplinary Action gave Petitioner
general notice of the facts at issue, as well as the alleged violations of policy.
Petitioner has not argued that there was inadequate notice of the foregoing
allegations.
The Appeals Board specifically found in support of each of the foregoing
allegations. In addition to discussing each allegation specifically, the Appeals Board
declared that the evidence presented at the hearing supported the allegations as
"outlined in the notices and in the notice of termination." R.379. The Appeals Board
did not base its decision on any matters that were not presented through evidence
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at the hearing. And as discussed below, the Appeals Board did not base its
affirmation of the termination on any policies or bases not covered by the Notice of
Disciplinary Action.

C.

All Evidence Heard by the Appeals Board, and Subsequently
Discussed in the Decision by the Appeals Board, Was Sufficiently
Related to the Bases for Termination Listed in the Notice of
Disciplinary Action.
Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) allows an appeal board to hear evidence

"which relates to the cause for the discharge." This "imposes a requirement that the
Appeal Board consider just those instances of misconduct that the [employer]
identified as the grounds for terminating [the employee] and of which [the
employee] had been given prior notice." Fierro, 2012 UT App 304 at1 22. Any
deviation from these standards in the Appeal Board decision should be considered
a reversible abuse of discretion only if it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Gallegos, 2016 UT App 122, 17, 377 P .3d 185,
citing Rosen v. Saratoga Springs City, 2012 UT App 291, ,r 8,288 P.3d 606.
Petitioner has alleged that the Appeals Board considered evidence unrelated
to the bases for termination listed in the Notice of Disciplinary Action. However, as
discussed above, Petitioner has failed to cite to any specific examples. Respondents
herein are confident that the Appeals Board's consideration of the evidence and
findings in support of upholding termination were based solely on facts sufficiently
related to the specific bases for termination listed in the Notice of Disciplinary
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Action.
For example, the Notice of Disciplinary Action lists three bases for termination
which were associated with the January 25 meeting between Petitioner and his
supervisor, including dishonesty regarding Petitioner's memory of what had earlier
transpired, dishonesty regarding Petitioner's use of his cell phone, and the specific
insubordinate act of walking out of the meeting and snidely remarking, "Good luck
with that," when threatened with discipline. Those several bases for termination
were laced throughout the January 25 meeting. Therefore, the Appeals Board heard
and considered evidence of recordings from and testimony about the entirety of the
January 25 meeting, including the final act of walking out. In its findings and
decision to uphold termination, the Appeals Board discussed the insubordinate acts
of Petitioner during that meeting. R.380. After declaring that Petitioner had been
insubordinate during the meeting, the Appeals Board explained that leaving the
meeting in such a manner was merely the "capstone" of Petitioner's insubordinate
behavior. Id. The Appeals Board then goes on to find that Petitioner "repeatedly
refused to answer questions, was evasive, omitted facts, was dishonest about facts
and circumstances, demonstrated a defiant and hostile attitude toward his
supervisor, refused to provide the video when requested to do so after finally
acknowledging its existence, and constantly and loudly tapped his pen on the desk
during the conversation." Id. While some of these details were not specifically
discussed in the Notice of Disciplinary Action, Respondents herein are confident that
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they are sufficiently related to the matters within the Notice of Disciplinary Action
that the Appeals Board committed no violation in considering them. Furthermore,
the Appeals Board's decision to consider these facts does not exceed the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality.

D.

Even If a Portion of the Bases for Termination Is Considered to Be
Outside the Scope of Appropriate Consideration by the Appeals
Board, this Is Harmless Error as the Appeals Board Found a Broad
Range of Reasons to Terminate Petitioner.
This Court has previously stated that in the case of error by an appeal board,

"We will set aside the [appeal board's] decision only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Gallegos, 2016
UT App 122 at,t16, citing Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746,
755 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). In determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that any error would affect the outcome of the proceedings, this Court must
determine whether substantial evidence exists in support of the elected discipline at
issue, independent of any error. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. "Substantial evidence
is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Appeals Board made the following specific finding:
The Board makes the determination and finding that in light of the
particularly serious violations of dishonesty and insubordination
combined with the other violations including inefficiency, misusing city
property, deliberately restricting output, violation of the cell phone
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policy that the sanction of termination is not an abuse of discretion."

There is no indication, nor does Petitioner argue, that the Appeals Board
might have reached a different conclusion if the Appeals Board had not considered
facts which were related to but not specifically discussed in the Notice of Disciplinary
Action. For example, the Appeals Board found specifically that Petitioner's exit from
the January 25 meeting was independently an act of insubordination, as discussed
in the Notice of Disciplinary Action. It cannot be argued that the Appeals Board
would have characterized that act differently if it had not considered the
insubordinate acts during the January 25 meeting which occurred prior to
Petitioner's exit from that meeting.
Furthermore, after an opportunity to observe Petitioner during the review
hearing, the Appeals Board made specific findings of dishonesty and insubordination
even during the review hearing itself:
The Board is overwhelmingly convinced based upon its observations of
Mr. Augustus during the hearing, his testimony at the hearing, and his
attitude and statements during his meeting with his supervisor and his
inconsistent statements arising from the pre-disciplinary hearing that
he lacks credibility, that he is dishonest, and that he was and remains
insubordinate. In general Mr. Augustus was the most compelling
witness against himself.
R.378. These continued violations, even in the presence of the Appeals Board,
cannot allow any argument that the Appeals Board would have reached a different
conclusion if the Appeals Board is found to have ventured outside the content of the
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Notice of Disciplinary Action.
Moreover, Petitioner has not contested the Appeals Board's findings of
dishonesty, which the Appeals Board described as a "particularly serious violation".
R.378. In fact, most of the bases given for the termination are not contested in the
brief and should therefore be considered admitted.

Even if the acts of

insubordination are removed from the picture, it cannot be argued that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the outcome ofthe proceedings would be different because
the dishonesty remains, together with the other less serious violations, and
termination remains the discipline that is "(1) appropriate to the offense and (2)
consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department." See Harmon v.

Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2007 UT App 336, 11 8, 171 P.3d 474 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of the Appeals Board is still
supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has not effectively argued otherwise.

CONCLUSION
· In sum, Petitioner's termination should be upheld because the Appeals Board
did not abuse its discretion in upholding the City Manager's decision to terminate
Petitioner. Petitioner's arguments that Petitioner's supervisor violated the law do
not have any basis in law or fact. Petitioner's argument that the decision of the
Appeals Board should be reversed because the Appeals Board allegedly considered
facts outside the scope of the Notice of Disciplinary Action should also fail because
the argument is inadequately briefed, the Board considered only matters sufficiently
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related to the bases for termination described in the Notice of Disciplinary Action,
and/ or any error on the part of the Appeals Board was harmless error.
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Michael D. Harrington
Attorney for Respondent Vernal City
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ADDENDUM A
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
DATF.:

RE:

Russell Augustus
Ken Bassett, City Mansgc1·
Marcb 21, 2016

Notice ofDisciplinary Action

Dear Mr. Augustus,
On Friday, March 4, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. a pre-disciplinary hearing was held at the Vernal City
office at 374 East Main regarding alleged violations of the Vernal City policies.and procedures
manual. This pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled 10 allow you the opportunity to respond to
allegations that you violated provisions of this manual, specifically:
l . l 2.05.030 (D) Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perfoon assigned duties; (M)
Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of any employee; and
(N) Deliberately restricting output;
2. \ 2.05.030 CW) Act of Dishonesty related lo job performance.
3. 12.05.030 (AA) Displaying insubordinate behavior;
.
4. 12.05.030 (A) A violation of any of the City Personnel Policies or Procedures or any other
administrative policies as adopted by resolution of the Vernal City Council (not having
your cell phone available as required by the cell phone use agreement dated April 22, 2013
and cell phone policy of the City, and 12.05.030 (W) Act of dishonesty related to job
perfonnance.

Notice of Decision:

Incident #1 / Violation #1. January 21, 2016: In the pre-disciplinary hearing notice, it was
alleged that on the afternoon of January 21, 2016 both you (driving) and Michael Leigh,
(passenger), were observed traveling on 1500 East adjacent to the City yard (Sumpsions) in the
City bucket truck. At this particular time, however, you had been given previous direction that
your task to be performed was located on the west end of the City on Highway 40 associated with
the banners. Also, at this time as you were on 1500 East adjacent to the City yard it was obser:ved
that y ou were either taking photographs or video of an employee who was al that time located in
that yard, specifically BJ Partridge. There had been no direction given to you be in that area of
the City while, in fact, you should have been working on your job duties assigned with the banners
on west Highway 40.

Mr. Augustus, based on the information from the pre-disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the
interview which you had with Mr. Allred on January 25lh, your work time sheets specifically for
January 24th and your job description for the position of Street Equipment Operator II, I have
detenni.ned that the allegations so stated in incident # I and Violation # l are substantiated.
Your work assignment, working with Mr. Michael Leigh on January 21si, was that of putting up
banners on Main Street and Highway 40 working with Jeff Gardner, who was supervising that
project. You had been working on the west end of Highway 40 that morning. The bucket truck
which you were using had some operation problems. and you and Mr. Leigh retwned the bucket
truck to Motor Pool for repairs. Later in the clay after l'wicb, you and Mr. Leigh took the bucket
truck, after it bad been repaired, fueled it, and immediately proceeded to go to the 1500 East yard,
(Sumpsions) at which time you stopped and purposely took pictures of BJ Partridge who was
operating the loader at that sire.
ln the pre-disciplin~ hearing, it was noted that during the interview which you had with Mr.
Allred on January 25 , you could not remember whether or-not you had gone to the l 500 East yard
or whether you had, at that time, taken photogr1hs / video of Mr. Partridge working at that site.
At the pre-disciplinary hearing held on March 4 , however, you did remember that you did make
that trip in the bucket truck with Mr. Leigh for the purpose of taking pictures of Mr. Partridge
working there at the 1500 East yard. It was repre;;ented during the pre-disciplinary hearing on
March 4th that you were tired, and that you had worked many hours the day before, and that
possibly was the reason why you could not remember going to 1500 Eac;t. I determined., however,
that o'n the evening of January 24, 20 I 6 you finished the snow plowing responsibilities that you
had and left work at approximately 7:30 p.m. after having worked 14 hours snow plowing. I have
concluded that this was certainly ample time to get the sleep that you needed before you came to
work the next morning on January 25th • I do 11ot accept your reasoning that you could not
remember going to the 1500 East yard or remember that you took photographs / video simply
because you were fatigued because of the hours that you had worked the day before.
It was further represented du.ring the pre-disciplinary hearing on March 4th that your reasoning for
going to the 1500 East yard in the afternoon, after lm1ch, in the bucket truck for the purpose of
obse1ving Mr. Partridge operating the loader was consistent with your job description assignments
as "a supervisor". The Vernal City job description for a Streets Equipment Operator Il indicates
"acts as lead worker or supervisor as required during construction and maintenance projects or in
the absence of the street superintendent". Specifically, regarding you going to the 1500 East yard

and taking pictures / video, these were not required supervisory activities for that day, the street
superintendent was not absent that.day, ngr had.-an:Y0µe asb4 :or- requi~·ect you to supervise any
aspect of your job assignment for that" paf:ttcular:-~y~ Yo~ ·~s~p,d -~uties d~g: with the
banners and•w.o~g witltMr .-Gar_4ftetbacfboen_gi~en:at1he"·beg~\ottl1e wot]t dayfhowever,
it~':Y()ut:-tn ip ·s~to· the rsuo.~t-1.•cl:s.lmpty:'.~:~!i~-~f.);fr.,PWdge-·ope~ng
thtf't~~: . -~-.j~~o,'.ypu took Mr. ~_gh,.,,way.~nr~·l!S$\~~~, as weltQ:opetdng a
p{e¢tofVd}~-~equipment (the bueket-truck)for a pttrpose1hat-Was not l)art·of your work
duties·that'particular day.
1

Mr, Augustus, I therefore find that you were not satisfactorily perforn1ing your assigned job duties,
that yo~. were 1ni~µs~g City equip~ent (the buok~t tTI3Qk}f9r. a.purpose that was not part of yQur
aSsjgtj&i'duties, attifithafyou were also'.tesl'ticting the output ofa: fe1low employee, Michael Leigh,

by notperihtming your assigned duties.

Incident:#2 / Violation #2. On Monday, .lan.uary25'1' at approximatelj) 3: 15 pm you were :askttd
to be in fl meeting with your supervisor Glade Allred. You pttended that meeti7!g at which time
Mr. Al!red proceeded to ask you several q~e~(i(!n.s regqrqipg p~"Yf~us inclile~ wh'tch had
oc.~e'd as part ofyour per/or!'Jance. one .iJf'wbldli- in~ulleii;yoti· ikivinJ ·11i .-the· liucket truck on
'fl1Ui's.ila,. January 1181 w.tth Mtvhda1 btigh dh· tnlf venitlb wiih')JOU. During-the"'1rie'e'Jing Mr.
Allredmkedyou-sp~cificallyify®had, ,infact drlven1he bucket truckto·tMJSO()East lot.Jn the
aftm2oon. 'You lrµllcated io 'him tiiat yoii could not remembe1~ when -i11fe.e1, wiJne.ss statements
fr;,m• two indi.yiduals indicated that you ·had indeed driven alnng JSO(J- ·East by the City yard
(Surttpions) laking pictures or videos.
I :wilLstate as I stated above, in Incident #lt Violation #1:
· ln the ·pre;-disciplbl~ hearing" h was lfGted: tl,utt &µing 'the interview which you had with Mr.
Allted;'on-January~2St ·yo~--~~ld;tot'~i~r~ethe{9tl.1otyoµ had gone to thc-J~00:1-t.yard
or w:l\~ttier yo~ -~ad,.lJithattim~ taken·'p'llo~bfl:vid~ o,·Mt.:i~dge wt?rkiDg~a,Hhat ~ite.
At the pi'e-4i~Qgjliriafy:heanng1ndld 6ti.~n .4t1i~lioWev~~ yoti ~'-tiillmlberthatyott Jtiacm that
trip in the' bucke't1tnck witl1-Mr.Leiglfforthe:pm)'Ostroftalci"ngJji~of'Mr. Partridge working
there at the 1500 East yard. It was. repres¢nted:d~~g,the ~e-di$Qjplliwy b~ng tbat .you were
tired and that you had worlrett.,fho~-the day ~fore:1ma,~tp~lyw~ t\ie'-~Ql') that you
could not remember going:to 1500~. l~etetmlne<f-tliat{'~tfthe,everiittg-:ofJan~:24, 2016 you
finished the snow plowing respoi:JsmWW tnafji6utiaihiiidleft'w• at·ap_p~~ly'7:00 pm 7=30 pm-after-hav:ing worked 14ho»rs·sriowptowmg. tHavcf®tlciudett:imf1his was~tun· i<ftime
to get the $leep'tljat}'9M~e$1l1!$te,~ am\!! w'~iki!\e~j,U~;l)nJ~
ldo
0

lSK

~oi·:~_f<>l.lt~;tJiatyou coµl411ot-remeD;iber·gojn~1lie 1,no~yard;-ot remember
tlmt-you took pK616gmplis l video sitnpty·because y-ou were fatigued· because of the hours that you
had worked the day before.

Mr. Augustust based on the informatio.n from the pre-disciplinary-hearing, the transcriptiQn of the
interview which you had. with Mr. Allred on January 2511', your work time sheets.specifically for
January 25 th , I have dete1mined that the. allegations so stated in Incident #2 / Violation #2 are
substantiated.

~.

.)
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Incident #3 / Violation #3. On January 25, 2016 you were asked to attend a meeting in Glade
Al/red's office, your supervisor. You anended that meeting, howevet, during the course of thar
meeting you indicated that you were going to leave. Mr. Allred asked you to stay because the
meeling was nbt yet completed, but you left anyway. Mr. Allred indicated to you that leaving the
meeting could constitule cause for disciplinary action up to and including termination of your
employment.
After reviewing both the infonnation from the pre-disciplinary hearing as well as the transcription
of the.interview which you.had with Mr. Allred on January 25th, I have deterrnin~d the allegations
in Incident #3 and Violation #3 are substa.ntiated.
Mr. Allred had indicated to you during the interview that although you communicated your intent
to leave prior to the interview being completed, he said you should not leave1.mtil he said that you
were allowed to leave. Further, the transcription indicates that Mr. Allred indicated that1fyou did
leave, your action ofleaving without-being invited to leave would be an act of insubordination that
would be followed up with disciplinary action up to and including termination of your
employment. Although the transcription of the tape shows that you and Mr. Allred were talking
over each other during th.is part of the discussion, the tape does indicate Mr. Allred's comment "up
to and including-tennination". You indicated dwi ng the pre-disciplinary hearirig that you did not
hear that, although in the trans~ription ofthe tape, you responded to Mr. Allred after he had asked
you to stay with the statement "have fun with that". I conclude that you did receive warning from
Mr. Allred that disciplinary action would be taken up to and iocludll}g tennination of your
employment. I find that your statement that you were not aware of Mr. Allred's directive not to
leave his office is directly contrary to your following statement "have fun with that", indicating to
me that you were not being honest in your answers given in the pre-disciplinary hearing.
Incident #4 / Violation ff4.
On January. 25, 2016 Mr. Glade Allred attempted to call you on
your cell phone. Later in the morning you appeared in Mr. Allred 's office who indicated to you
that he had been trying to get a hold of you on your cell phone. You indicated to him that "I
haven ;t had "IY cell phone ". However, it has been documented that you texted Sherri
Montgomery that same morning al 9:2.6 am, and several texts through 10:01 am on that very
morning on your cell phone showing that you did, in fact, have your cell phone with you.
The personnel manual of the City regarding the cell phone policy is as follows:
9.05.040-Employee responsibilities. Any employee of the City receiving either a cell phone
allowanc.e or a City issued cell phone will sign the City cell phone.use / and or allowance request
form thereQy certifying tha~ he or she will provide their phone number witrun five days of
activation and will be available for caHs,(in possession of.the phone·an'd have it turned on) when it
may be required to be avrulable for City business. If not availabie to reeei:ve calls or transmit
calls, the employee shall so notify his depnrtment head.
The Vemal City cell phone allowaney ~1d use agreement which you signed on April 22, 2013
indicates that you agreed to abide by all regulations in the Vernal City personnel policies and
procedures manual pertaining to the use of the cell phone.

I
I

'
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Specifically,-regarding incident#4 on January 25th, you indicated to Mr. Allred in the meeting with
him that "I hayen't-h&d my cell phone." Furth-er, -during the interview with Mr. Allred, you
indicated "my-phone has been off all day."
During tlie pre-=<fiscipl:inary hearing, you ·did acknotledge-that you had texted Sherri Montgome1y
and she had text~d.you tht:: mormng :o f January 25-'. IA fact, Ms. Montgomery indicated during
the.pre-discipli!lai"y hearing that that had.occurred between 9:26 am and 10:0I am.
th

Duriri~:~e pre-discipti.nary' hearing, you bad sub~itted a phone fog fr0f!1 Jan.~ary-25 produced by
Straut:Networks'showihg that-you had not'received::a phone call from Mr. Allied or any texts from
M~. N-1.oq'tgo~ecy. Duril}g .the prtX!isci~linary·h<?aring thy record shows that you were asked to
pr6_ducpe,f mor~'cpmplete·phone Iag.from,Strata:Networks,, Th~.Citydid l'CcCCive an e-mail from
Mt. K'.;6sselrin8, yo'ur,attomey; "indicat.mtthatlyou.weri,hav.ing,dif.ficul.ty getting tha:t reeord from·
Strata. Mr. 'Harr.ington responded to Mt. Kesselring indicating to 1nm spe-cifi'c dl.rections ns to
how yo'lnnight obtain that record and.if you C'ouldhlt tofu1ther:give M.r. -Harrington,a -c~ll•ana 1te
would see i'the rcould foliow through with tl\.e request. Mr: .Kesselring diMespond indicating that
no furthe,r-de(ail.of ypur pbone log coulg. be obtnined without'-pr.oviding a subpoena. I do have
evidence,- however, showing that Mr. A'l!red did try to '.get' a hold of-you the morning of January
2:51", and also faat Ms. Montgomery. did. text ·you ·and you ·texted her back '•n January 25 th • l
conci~de, therefore, that yot1 drd'have yow- P,hone during the morning of January 25 th and that you
be~ using j.our' pho.ne during the morning of January'2.51h. However, it was your choice not
to answer the phbne call from- Mi-. Allred, dwfo'g the mQi"riing of ranuary 25th •

naa

A!fter reviewing the infonnatfon from the pre-disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the
interview wnicli·you had with.Mr: Allred·on January 251h, the phone records of Mr. Allred and Ms.
Mon~goroer-y, 9:9-d your own phone logs submitt~ at the hearing, I have determined that the
allegations i11;.Incidertt #4 and Violatfon #4 are substantiated.
Decision for Disciplinary Actio;n: Based on the:substantiation of the violations of Vernal City
personnel policies and procedures·manual as noted.above and after considering.your responses to
the above nllegationS'dunngihe pre-discipLiflacy hearing, {nave detennined-that'the allegations as
listed above are, in fact, substantiated and as a result of.this ~15stantiation of these vfolations it is
my decision to terminate your employmeut with Vernal City effective immediately.

Tn accordance with Utah State law and Vernal City polic'}',, you ·hav.e the right to file a formal
appeal of your tennination of employment to"the Vernal ·City 0ouncil who serves as the Appeals
Board of the Cify following the exhaustion 9f-the grievance procedures as established by Vernal
City personnel· policies Chapter 16. Suoh appe;,.1s shall ~filed witMhe City Recorder within ten
( I0) days after completing the grievance procedure. Please contac.tme or Roxanne Behunin if
there are any questions regarding the process to file an appeal ofthis.decision. Enclosed fur your
reference is a copy of the Utah 1 State 9ode 10~3-1106 and Vernal City Code 2.80..020 - 2.80.025
which more.specifically outlines the appeals process.

ln processing your termination of employment, several documents will need to be provided. We
will make these available to you. The prompt execution of these documents would he
appreciated. Please note that health and dental benefits will continue through March 31, 20 16.
Your final paycheck will be issued within 72 hours of you submitting a final time sheet.

4.x-6.d<>J&f

Ke~sett, City Manager

Signature of Russell Augustus
Receipt of Disciplinary Notice
cc: personnel file

Date
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MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540
ALLRED , BROT HERSON & HARRINGTON, P . C.
Attorneys for Vernal City
148 South Vernal Ave. Suite 101
Vernal, Ut ah 84078
Telephone:
(435) 789-7800
harrington@abhlawfirm.com
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD
VERNAL CITY COUNCIL, VERNAL CITY
UINTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH

•

IN THE APPEAL OF
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE:
TERMINATION APPEAL
RUSSEL AUGUSTUS

Background :

Russell Augustus , the Appellant, appealed the decision o f
the City Manager , which was issued following a pre- disciplinary
hearing held March 4 , 2016 in the Vernal City administrative
conference room.
The Appellant was given notice of the pre-disciplinary
hearing on January 29, 2016.
The Appellant was present a t t he pre-disciplinary hearing
along with h i s attorney, Christian Kesselring . The City was
represented by Mike Harrington.
Witnesses were called and testified at that pre-disciplinary
hearing and the Appellant had an opportunity to present his
response to the issues raised by the pre-disciplinary hearing
notice .
The reasons for potential disciplinary action we r e outlined
in the notice of the hearing and were reviewed again at the
beginning of the pre-disciplinary hearing by the hearing officer
Kenneth Bassett.
A written decision and notice of disciplinary action was
issued by Ken Bassett fol l owing the hearing , in which he reviewed
each of the charges , and outlined briefly the findings, and found
that each of the allegations were substantiated.
The employee/Appellant, was advised by a written Notice of
Disciplinary Action dated March 21, 2016 that based upon the
substantiated violations , his employment with Ver nal City
was t erminated effective immediately.

Mr. Augustus, the Appellant, through his attorney, filed a
Notice of Appeal dated March 30, 2016.
By stipulation the parties agreed that the hearing before
the Appeal Board would be held beginning at 4:30 PM on May 3,
2016 in the Vernal City Council Chambers.

The Appellant was present, represented by his attorney
Christian Kesselring, the City was represented by Michael
Harrington. The Board was assisted by its legal advisor Dennis L.
Judd.
Each of the parties identified the witnesses they intended
to call and those witnesses were sworn and the Hearing Board
invoked the exclusionary rule.
The following witnesses were called and examined:
Called by the City:
Glade Allred
Ken Bassett
BJ Partridge
Leon Morris
Rick Green
Sherri Montgomery
Russell Augustus
Called by Appellant:
Michael Leigh
Russell Augustus
Clay Simmons
Rick Green
~
ayaA &aiae~t1oa:c II I
-.1'.eseph Nan·hon

..

Ken Bassett
Glade Allred
The parties stipulated to the admission of a packet of
exhibits from each party.
Near the end of the hearing counsel for the parties
requested an opportunity to submit a brief on several legal
issues which the Hearing Board agreed to allow with the briefs to
be submitted by May 10, 2016. Those briefs were submitted and
were considered by the Board prior to voting and making its
decision.
At the conclusion of the hearing the Board met briefly to
deliberate but, due to the lateness of the hour, adjourned the
meeting and deliberations and agreed to resume deliberations on
May 9th, 2016 at 8:00 PM to allow the Board an opportunity to
review all of the exhibits and carefully consider the testimony
and evidence presented.

)

The Board met on May 9 , 2016 but had not yet received the
briefs from the parties and after deliberating and discussing the
evidence further, adjourned the meeting until May 16 , 2016, at
6:00 eM to allow opportunity to consider the briefs before making
a final decision.
Each of the Board members has carefully considered the
testimony and evidence presented at the hea ring , as well as the
exhibits submitted by the parties by stipulation, and has
listened to the recording of the meeting between t he Appellant
and his department head Glade Allred on January 25, 2016 , the
pre-disciplinary hearing transcript, and has considered not only
the words spoken but the demeanor and to ne of voice of the
Appellant and othe r witnesses from the hearing before the Board
and the meeting on January 25, 2016 .
The Board has considered the briefs submitted by each of the
parties.
The Board considered the proposed ballot and the comments
made by counsel for each party regarding the ballot and adopted
the ballot prepared by the legal counsel for the Board, a copy of
which is attached.
The standard of review used by the Board in considering the
actions and decision of the City Manager to terminate the
Appe l lant is abuse of discretion wi th the evidentiary standard of
substantial evidence being required to support the ba sis of the
decision.
Four (4) reasons or policy violations were noted in the
Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing and in the Notice of
Discipl inary Action . They were :
1 . Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform
assigned duties; misu sing , destroying, or damaging any city
property, or the property of any employee; deliberately
restricting output;
2 . Dishonesty related to job performance;
3 . Insupordination; and
4 . Violation of city personnel policies or procedures,
including the ce ll phone policy.
Having considered the documents filed with the Board, the
evidence and the arguments, and now being fuly informed,
The Board Finds That :

A. Regarding the charge of "inefficiency or inability to
satisfactorily perform assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or
damaging any city property , or the property of an y employee;
deliberately restricting outputu:
1. On January 21 , 2016 the Appellant was assigned to place

banners on poles on the west side of the city under the direction
of Jeff Gardner, who was the designated supervisor of that
project. Mr. Augustus was operating a bucket truck owned by the
city.
2. Later in the morning, the bucket truck experienced
mechanical problems and was returned to motor pool for repairs.
While the bucket truck was being repaired, the Appellant drove a
city pickup truck to the 1500 East Yard, reportedly to check on
the repair of a water line leak, and, as he was driving away from
that location with Mr. Leigh as a passenger, had a conversation
with his supervisor Mr. Allred.
3. After lunch the Appellant took the bucket truck with Mr.
Michael Leigh, another city equipment operator, as a passenger,
fueled the truck, and then proceeded down 500 North, turning
South on 1500 East to pass by the 1500 East Yard. The Appellant
claims that his purpose in taking that route was to fix banners
on the east side of town that Mr. Leigh had earlier installed
incorrectly. There is no evidence that Mr. Gardner or Mr. Allred
approved diverting equipment and personnel from the west side of
town to the east side of town.
4. The Board finds that the real reason for the diversion
was that the Appellant desired to drive by the 1500 East Yard to
video another city employee, BJ Partridge, who was testing a
piece of city equipment at that yard, as assigned by Mr. Allred.
5. The video was taken using the Appellant's cell phone,
which is a city subsidized cell phone, and as such is subject to
city cell phone policy.
6. It appears from the video that the Appellant introduced
at the hearing, that the Appellant was driving the city bucket
truck while videoing with his cell phone, which is an unsafe and
illegal practice. During the meeting between Mr. Augustus and Mr.
Allred on January 25, Mr. Augustus refused to answer questions
about where he took the bucket truck after lunch and claimed
several times that he returned to the west side of the city to
work on banners as he had been assigned. In subsequent
proceedings, the Appellant admitted that that was not true.
7. The Appellant later claimed that the purpose of the video
was safety concerns, however the Board finds that the video was
never provided to his department head in spite of a request that
he do so, nor was it provided to anyone else in the city
administration until the hearing before the Appeals Board. The
Board finds that the Appellants statements regarding the video
are false.
8. The Board notes that when questioned by his supervisor,
Glade Allred, several days after the incident the Appellant was
very evasive and was not truthful about the purpose of his going
by the 1500 East Yard.

9. Mr. Augustus's claims about the reason for his taking the
video lack credibility for at least the following reasons:
a. If he was concerned about safety of persons or
equipment he should have immediately provided the video to Mr.
Allred or to Allen Parker or Ken Bassett, which he did not do and
in fact refused to provide the video;
b. He was evasive and untruthful about having taken the
video, and the purposes of the video; it appea r s from the video
that was provided that he was driving by the yard while taking
the video rather than stopping in a safe manner to take the video
and reporting his concerns immediately to appropriate city
officials ;
c . He f ailed and refused to provide the video to his
supervisor when d irectly requested to do so, and c laimed during
the meeting that he did not have his cell phone and did not know
where it was , which is a violation of city policy.
10 . The charges in Count one are establish e d by substantial
evidence.
11 . The Appellant was operating a large piece of city
equipment in an area where he should not have been, occupying the
time of that equipment and the time of himself and another city
emp l oyee, engaging in activity which he apparently felt
uncomfortable in reporting or admitting to his supervisor when
questioned , at a time when he had been assigned to work at the
opposite end of the city.
12 . The Appellant's conduct wasted city resources and placed
the city at risk and was contrary to his assigned work area.
13. Mr. Augustus's statements regarding the incident lack
any credibility.
B. Regarding the charge of "dishonesty related to job
performance":
1 . The Board, having reviewed the transcript of t he meeting
between Mr. Augustus and his department head Mr . Allred, and
having heard the tone of voice and the evasiveness evidenced in
that interview, and based upon the hearing testimony and
exh i bits, finds that the Appellant was dishonest in his
statements and explana tions concerning his activities on January
21 , 2015 , inc luding the r easo n for taking the city bucket truck
and another city employee to 1500 East and in his stated reasons
for videoing Mr. Partridge.
2 . The Appellan t refused to acknowledge videoing a fellow
city employee operating a piece of city equipment , was evasive,
and avoided or refused to answer direct questions concerning the
incident.

3. The Appellant stated that he would provide a copy of the
video when he finally acknowledged that he had it, which he
failed to do.
4. The Appellant falsely stated that his concern was the
safety of an employee or equipment which, as outlined above,
lacks any credibi lity.
5. At the hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board
observed Mr. Augustus, both while he was testifying and when he
was not testifying, and finds that his answers to questions
propounded by the attorney for the city were evasive, that his
demeanor evidenced lack of truthfulness, and that based upon his
action s and statements in the recorded conversation with his
supervisor and his testimony at the hearing it is difficult to
afford any degree of credibility to the statements made by the
Appellant .
6 . The Board finds that there is substantial evidence to
support the finding that the Appellant was dishonest:
a. He sta t ed that he could not remember or had not gone
by the 1500 Eas t Yard;
b . He claimed that he had returned to work putting up
banners on the west side of the city, traveling along 100 North;
c. He claimed that he did not have his telephone when
Mr. Allred attempted to contact him on January 25 ;

d . He stated that his purpose in going by the 1500 East
yard was solely to fix banners on the East side of the city.
e. When questioned during his meeting with his
supervisor and at the hearing about matters that he did not want
to admit to or discuss, Mr. Augustus was deceptive and claimed he
couldn ' t remember , yet on the same dates he appeared to have a
very vivid recollection when it served his interests;
f . The Board finds the testimony of Ricky Green, who
reported Mr. Augustus to be dishonest to be credible; and
g. Mr. Augustus changed his story repeatedly, and
omitted facts and feigned lack of memory. Mr . Augustus a ls o made
misleading statements about his use of city equipment and about
the video, and made dishonest statements about taking the video
and about the purpose of the video.
C. Regarding the charge of " in subordination":
1. The Board has reviewed the transcript and listened to the
recording of the meeting between the Appellant and his department
head Mr. Allred on January 25, 2016, and finds that there is more
than substantial evidence to show that the Appe l lant was
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insubordinate throughout the meeting with his supervisor.
2 . The Appellant ' s general tone of voice , attitude , tapping
o f a marker on the table, and refusal and failure to answer
questions honestly and directly demonstrated a l ack of respect
for his supervisor.
3. The Appellant was evasive, refused to ans wer questions,
was disrespectful, ordered the supervisor to "move on'' after
evading quest i ons, cursed , and ultimate l y walked out of the
meeting after being spe cifically and clearly d irected by his
supe r visor to remain in the meeting. Moreover , he did walk out
afte r being advised that refusal to remain in the meeting would
be considered insubordination and may result in his termination.
4 . The Appel lant's disrespectful retort as he left the
meeting "good luck with that" further i llustrates a ser ies of
disrespectful and insubordinate stateme nts and conduc t by the
Appellant during that meeting toward his supervisor, which is
illu strated to some degree by the transcript but more forcefully
by the audio recording of the meeting.
5 . The Board is convinced that the purpose of the
Appellant ' s video on the east side of the city on January 21,
when he was assigned to work on the west side of the city, was
not motivated by a safety concern but rather was an effort to
undermine and get information to damage his department head .
6. The Appellant's attitude during the meeting with Mr.
Allred was insubordinate, confrontationa l , dishonest , and
disrespectful.
7. At no time following that meeting did the Appellant make
any effort to apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any
wil lingness or desire to work cooperatively with his supervisor
or make any effort to resolve any concerns or differences.
8. Had the Appellant's attitude following that meeting up to
and through the hearing before the Board been different or mo r e
cooperative or upfront and honest t he result might well have been
different. In stead the Appellant has remained defiant, aggressive
and dishonest.
9 . In the meeting with Mr. Allred , the Appellant was
requested at least twice to provide a copy of the video that he
took while driving the city truck , yet he did not provide that
until played for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals
Board . During his testimony before the Appeals Board he claimed
no one asked for the video which is a clear act of dishonesty and
false statement under oath before the Appeals Board, as shown by
the audio recording and trans cription of that meeting .
10. From all of the evidence, including the transcripts and
recording of the interview with his supervisor through the

hearing before the Appeals Board, the Board finds that Mr.
Augustus's actions have been targeted towards undermining his
supervisor so that he could take over the Department.
11. Mr. Augustus's statements about his not having his phone
available when his supervisor was attempting to contact him are
untruthful and also insubordinate. It is clear that he had his
telephone available since he made use of it, yet he failed to
answer calls from his supervisor or to return calls that had been
made to him.

12. The Appellant was untruthful in claiming that his texts
with Sherri Montgomery were during his break since the time line
of those texts demonstrates a period in excess of a normal break.
13. The Appellant is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing
to admit his activities, lying about his activities, and failing
to acknowledge his fault and misconduct when he made a mistake.
His attitude throughout has been to cast blame on others but not
to take any responsibility himself.
14. The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only
demonstrated by the transcripts and recordings prior to the
hearing, but the Board notes, his facial expressions, demeanor
and behavior at the hearing when answering questions regarding
the events and during the testimony of Mr. Allred including
smirking, rolling his eyes and other conduct and expressions
further confirms a lack of respect and an insubordinate attitude.

15. A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect
was also demonstrated and observed by the Board during the
hearing. During the testimony of Mr. Bassett, Mr. Augustus was
observed to glare at the witness and rolled his eyes, and acted
in a hostile and disrespectful manner.
16. The Vernal City Road Department is a fairly small
department with a limited number of employees. The actions of Mr.
Augustus show that he is not amenable to supervision and cannot
work there under the direction of the department head, Mr.
Allred. This results in part from his insubordination and his
dishonesty in dealing with his department head and with others
and from the fact that he has not made any effort to resolve the
issues or acknowledge his misconduct. Even at the hearing it was
apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful attitude, and
has no willingness to acknowledge his own errors. Any discipline
less than termination would not bring about needed change. The
Appellant's return to the road department would be detrimental to
the morale, productivity, and operation of the department, and
would undermine the ability of Mr. Allred to manage the
employees.
D. Regarding the charge of "violation of city personnel
policies or procedures, including the cell phone policy":

•
1 . There is substantial evidence that th e Appellant violated
the City's cell phone policies and p roce dures as indicated in the
Notice of Disciplinary Action and as outlined i n the findings set
forth above. The City Manager did not abuse his discretion in
finding violations of t he personnel policies including cell phone
policy .
E . Regarding issues raised in briefs:
1 . A supervisor has t he r ight and the responsibility to look
into concerns tha t arise about an employee and to investigate.
Tha t investiga tion may include inte r viewing or questioning the
employee or other witnesses. Such a meeting is part of the
supervisory responsibility of the superviso r or departmen t head,
and is not a pre-dis c ipline hearing, even if the supervisor has
outlined a list of questions or issues of concern pri or to the
meeting. Meeting with the Appellant to give him an opportunity to
explain what had transpired on January 21 was proper, and t he
fact that Mr . Allred had outli ned some possible ques t ions as part
of his fac t -finding pursuit does not undermine his credibility,
as suggested by the Appellant's brief.
2 . According to the Appel lant' s brief both Mr . Leigh and Mr.
Augustus were questi oned by their supervisor o n January 25th
about the same incidents and both were instructed t o take some
paid vacation time . Apparently Mr. Leigh responded differently to
the meeting with his supervisor than Mr. Augustus such t hat he
was not terminated. As out l ined above, Mr. Augus t us' s attitude
and behavior took him down an entirely different r oad .
3. Insubordination.
a. The Board finds that Mr . Augustus behavior,
statements, and actions demonstrate that when he igno red the
directions to help f in ish install i ng banners on the wes t side of
the city and instead drove the city bucket truck and another city
employee to the east side o f the city and passed the yard while
taking video wi th his city subsidized phone , his i ntent was to
unde rmine his department head , Mr. Allred. The video that he took
of another employee operating the city equipment , which was
provided for . t he first time at the hearing before the Appeals
Board demonstrates t ha t he was unsafely operating the city bucket
truck by videoing while driving, and i t appears that he had
planned i n advance to take the video a nd had manipulated his
phone wh ile d riving and pri or to reaching the yard .
b. The claims made by the Appellant that the purpose of
videoing was to address a safety concern i s entirely contradicted
by h is fa i l ure to provide that video to anyone in t he ci ty or to
r eport his concerns to his supervisor or other c ity officials.
c. In fact, Mr. Augustus went out of his way to avoid
admitting t hat he had t ake n the video during his me eting with h i s
supervisor and failed and refused in spi te of repeated requests

to provide the video taken on the city subsidized cell phone. In
so doing he violated city policy and contradicted any argument
that he undertook that activity for a legitimate purpose. When
interviewed several days later about the events on the day that
Mr. Augustus took the video with his cell phone, he claimed no
memory of that particular event but had good recall of the other
events of that same day. If he had a legitimate concern about
safety issues, it is not credible to believe that he would
remember other insignificant events of the day but lack recall as
to that matter.
d. During the interview with Mr. Allred, the Appellant
was evasive and defensive and aggressive when questioned on those
matters.
e. During his testimony before the hearing Board when
questioned by opposing counsel about those matters he once again
reacted in an evasive, confrontational manner.
f. During questioning by opposing counsel about matters
discussed during the staff or safety meeting· early in the day the
Appellant admitted that he missed a portion of the meeting to
take a personal phone call, yet insisted that he had a better
knowledge of everything that was discussed during that meeting
than his supervisor who was present for the entire meeting.
Moreover, the Appellant became intransigent and his behavior and
attitude on the stand was consistent with the tone of the
recording of his interview with Mr. Allred and evidenced lack of
credibility.
g. The events from January 21, 2016, and the attitude
and behavior of the Appellant from that time through the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing demonstrate more interest
in undermining his supervisor and no evidence whatsoever of any
effort or desire to work cooperatively within the Department
structure or chain of command.
h. The Appellant's attitude, nonverbal displays, and
facial expressions during the hearing on the stand were
disturbing and pronounced and reflect an attitude, disrespect,
and a disregard for truth.
i. The Appellant's statement as he left the meeting
with his supervisor in blatant disregard of the instruction that
he remain at the meeting - the comment "good luck with that" - is
consistent with the attitude and actions displayed at the
evidentiary hearing before the Board. The ''good luck with that''
attitude which remains unchanged shows that he cannot work
effectively under the supervision of the road department head,
and that his continuing presence there and insolent attitude
would be disruptive to the good order and efficient operation of
the entire department.
j. Had the Appellant at any time prior to the

pre-disciplinary hearing or even during the evidentiary hearing
demonstrated through hi s words and demeanor and behavior any
cha nge of attitude , recognition of his misconduct, any desire to
mend fences and work cooperatively with his supervisor and within
the structure of the department as a positive productive employee
the outcome might well be different.
4. Authority to Issue Order.
a. The Appellant has not provided any substantial
evidence that Mr. Allred did not have proper authority to direct
him to rema in at t he meeting. It is within the inherent authority
of a supervisor to inquire into issues of concern relating to an
employee and to request information from the employee as part of
that process. The nature of· the work for which the Appellant is
employed frequent ly requires work beyond a specific quitting
time.
b. Even if the Appellant were on an ei ght (8) hour day
schedule he had missed several hours that day for personal
business , and the supervisor could require him to stay.
c. The Department head did not order Mr. Augustus to
remain in the meeting for the purpose of providing "a foot
massage" but rather in an attempt to pierce the intransigent
refusal of the Appel lant to honestly and directly answer
questions propounded by his supervisor .
d. The Board believes that is a prope r exercise of
supervisory responsibility and authority.
5 . Paid Vacation Time.
a . Testimony at the he aring shows that the policy and
long-standing practice at the city has been that department heads
may, under appropriate circumstances , require an employee to take
several days of vacation. This may be to allow the employee to
deal with personal issues, or it may be to allow an employee time
to cool off or settle down . That i s paid time off . The direction
to Mr . Augustus to take vacation time was consistent with that
policy and practice . In light of the behavior and attitude of the
Appellant, Mr. Augustus, the direction to take some paid vacation
time off was advisable, and was not an abuse of discretion nor
did it exceed the authority of the supervisor.
b. The appli cation and imposition of paid vacation time
was a ll owed pursuant to city policies section 5.01 . 010 and action
5 .01 . 060, including the provision that "as he deems necessary, a
department head may require an employee to use any accrued
va cation leave . " The application and interpretation of that
policy by the department head and the city manager is consistent
with long-standing application and interpretation of that policy,
and the Appellant did not present any substantial evidence to the
contrary.

F. Regarding ballot issues:

1. Pre-Disciplinary Procedures.
a. Prior to imposing any discipline involving a
suspension without pay for more than two (2) days, termination,
transfer to a position of lesser pay for disciplinary reasons
etc. as defined by state statute, a notice of a pre-disciplinary
hearing including at least a brief outline of the charges or
allegations against the employee is required. A sufficient notice
of pre-disciplinary hearing was provided to the Appellant and he
was given notice or an outline of the allegations against him and
ample opportunity to prepare for that hearing. A hearing was
conducted at which he was represented by counsel and had an
opportunity to present his response to the allegations as well as
to question witnesses against him. No discipline which is subject
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1105 and 1106
was imposed prior to notice and the pre-disciplinary hearing.
Paid leave or vacation does not require a pre-disciplinary
hearing.
b. It is noted that Mr. Augustus repeatedly claimed
during the hearing that he was a supervisor or second-in-command
under the Department Head in the road department. Pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated section 10-3-1105 (2) (c) (vi) and {vii), a
person in that position, i.e. a deputy head of a municipal
department or division or a superintendent, may be an at will
employee not entitled to the procedural protections outlined in
the statute and the city ordinance.
2. Disparity of Discipline.

a. At the evidentiary hearing the defendant asked
questions about several other non-road department·ernployees whose
discipline was less than termination. The evidence shows that
each of those other employees demonstrated an entirely different
attitude when confronted with their mistakes and were willing to
acknowledge that they needed to change and committed to improved
behavior or performance. None of the other situations presented
demonstrated a continuing defiance and disrespectful attitude and
for that reason among others none of those cases are comparable
to the present case of Mr. Augustus.
b. The Appellant failed to present any substantial
evidence that he has been treated disparately and he has failed
to meet his burden in that regard.
3. Proportionality.
a. The Appellant has failed to present any evidence
that his discipline is disproportionate to the violations of
policy which the Board finds he committed. The Board unanimously
finds that the City Manager did not abuse his discretion in
imposing the discipline of termination in light of all of the
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facts and circumstances. The Board is overwhelmingly convinced
based upon its observations of Mr. Augustus during the hearing,
his testimony at the hearing, and his attitude and statements
during his meeting with his supervisor and his inconsistent
statements arising from the pre-disciplinary hearing that he
lacks credibility, that he is dishonest, and that he was and
remains insubordinate. In general Mr. Augustus was the most
compelling witness against himself.
G. The Board unanimously finds that the facts support the
charges made against the Appellant.
H. The Board unanimously finds that the charges warrant the
sanction imposed and that the disciplinary action of termination
should be sustained and that the City Manager did not abuse his
discretion in imposing the sanction of termination. In connection
therewith, the Board has considered as requested by the Appellant
whether the sanction imposed was proportionate to the offense and
whether or not the sanction is consistent with sanctions imposed
against other employees for similar conduct.

I. The Board makes the determination and finding that in
light of the particularly serious violations of dishonesty and
insubordination combined with the other violations including
inefficiency, misusing city property, deliberately restricting
output, violation of the cell phone policy that the sanction of
termination is not an abuse of discretion.
J. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the sanction of
termination is inconsistent with sanctions imposed against other
employees for similar conduct.
The Board Concludes That:

A. The claims of the Appellant that he is a supervisor or
second-in-command in the road Department may render him an at
will employee pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-31105(2) (vi)
and (iiv).
B. Notwithstanding that claim, the Appellant has been
afforded full due process consistent with the case law of the
United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of the State
of Utah and State statute and city ordinance.
C. The Appellant was given notice of a pre-disciplinary
hearing which sufficiently outlined the alleged misconduct and
violations of Vernal City personnel policies and procedures.
D. The Appellant was given more than a month to prepare for
the pre-disciplinary hearing, which was held on March 4, 2016.
E. At that hearing, the Appellant was represented by capable
counsel, and he had an opportunity to present testimony and
evidence in response to those allegations and to question

witnesses against him.
F. The City Manager conducted the hearing and made his
determination in light of the facts and information presented and
the applicable policies and standards of the city. The standard
of review of that decision is abuse of discretion.
G. Mr. Augustus timely filed his Notice of Appeal and
alleged that the City Manager's findings were not supported by
the evidence and that the decision to impose the penalty of
termination for the misconduct was arbitrary and capricious and
denied Mr. Augustus due process rights.
H. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager
first to determine if the findings are supported by the evidence.
The findings are each supported by substantial evidence.
I. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager
to determine if there was an abuse of discretion and if the City
Manager acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, thereby
denying Mr. Augustus his due process rights. The Board finds that
the City Manager (1) did not abuse his discretion, (2) did not
act in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and (3) did not deny
Mr. Augustus's due process rights under state and federal law.

J. Both substantive and procedural due process was afforded
to the Appellant throughout the proceedings.
K. Mr. Augustus was provided with adequate notice, prior to
termination or any loss of income, was provided with ample
opportunity to prepare, and was afforded a pre-disciplinary
hearing where he was represented by counsel.
L. The Appellant was afforded an appeal at a time he
stipulated to and during which he was ably represented by capable
and effective legal counsel and was allowed to call all of the
witnesses that he wished and to cross examine all of the
witnesses called by the city.
M. The Appellant was afforded the opportunity to submit any
exhibits that he wished for consideration by the Hearing Board
and to submit a brief on certain issues, which was carefully
considered by the Board.
N. From the evidence presented the Board has found a
violation by the Appellant of the policies outlined in the
notices and in the notice of termination.

o. The meeting between Mr. Allred and Mr. Augustus was an
appropriate exercise of supervisory responsibility by Mr. Allred
and did not require the formalities appropriate for a·
predisciplinary hearing.
P. The application and imposition of paid vacation time was

allowed pursuant to city policies section 5.01 . 010 and action
5.01.060.
Q. The conduct of Mr. Augustus ftt the meeting with his
department head on January 21, 2016 was insubordinate. The
capstone was his defiant refusal to remain in the meet ing when
specifically and directly instructed twice to do so by his
supervisor even when he was to l d that refusal t o remain would be
insubordinat i on and may result in his termination, the comment as
he walked out the door was "good luck wi th thatu. That was not,
by any means , the only insubordination du r ing that meeting
however . Listening to the recording of the meeting along with the
transcript shows t hat the Appellant repeatedly refused to answer
questions, was evasive , omitted facts, was d i s honest about facts
and circumstances , demonstrated a defiant and hostile attitude
towards his supervisor, refused to provide the video when
requested to do so after finally acknowledging its existence, and
constant l y and loudly tapped his pen on the desk during the
conversation. Throughout that process the Department Head
remained calm and did not raise his voice while the Appellant
became hostile and agitated after being informed and with full
knowledge that he was being recorded. Mr. Augustus never
acknowledged any personal responsibility or fault or error on his
part and continued to place all of the blame on Mr . Allred
consistent with his apparent intentional design to undermine the
authority of his department head .

R. The facts do not suppo r t a claim by the Appellant that he
believed in good faith that he was entitled to leave the meeting .
S. Consistent with state law and city policy, the only
disciplinary actions which invoke due process protections are:
dismissal , demotion or reduction in pay , suspension of over two
days without pay, or transfer to a position with less
remune r ation for disciplinary purposes. A meeting with the
Department Head to discuss possib le misconduct or a direction to
take paid vacation time does not constitute formal discipline
requiring approval of the City Manager for a predisciplinary
hearing.
T. The Board is not constrained strictly by the rules of
evidence and procedure required in judicial proceedings and was
intentionally very liberal in allowing the presentation of
evidence, i ncluding belaboring certain issues and lines of
questioning, so as to , within reason , allow the parties to
present whatever evidence they wished. Based upon the stipulation
of the parties t he Hearing Board also carefully studied all of
the exhibits including the audio files provided and video clip in
formulating its findings of fact in reaching its decision.
Decision of the Appeals Board

A. After hours of testimony at the hearing, additional hours
of study of exhibits, and hours of deliberation, the Board
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members each separately cast their ballots in. secret. The ballots
were delivered to the Deputy City Recorder/Clerk of the Hearing
who opened the envelopes in the presence of the Board and counted
ballots.
B. Ballot question number 1: Do the facts support the
charges made by the Department head?
Five (5) ballots were marked YES
Zero (0) ballots were marked NO.
C. Ballot question number 2: If you find that the employee
violated one or more of the Vernal City policies stated in the
termination notice did the City Manager abuse his discretion or
exceed his authority in terminating the employee?
Zero (0) ballots were marked YES
Five (5) ballots were marked NO.
D. The ballot instructed the Hearing Board members to
consider the following instruction which was added pursuant to a
request of the Appellant:
To decide if the Appellant's discipline was
unwarranted, or if the City Manager abused his
discretion or exceeded his authority, consider: (1)
when the violations of city policy are viewed as a
whole, in light of all the circumstances, is the
punishment disproportionate to the offenses such that
the sanction of termination is unwarranted, and (2) has
the Appellant demonstrated or shown that the sanction
of termination is wholly inconsistent with sanctions
imposed against other employees for similar misconduct?
E. The unanimous decision of the Hearing Board is that the
termination of the Appellant, Russell Augustus, s warranted. The
inati
s sustained.
appea ·s denied, anf1)he order of

ty Appeals Board
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Michael Harrington, counsel
for Vernal City
Christian Kesselring, counsel
for Appellant Russell Augustus
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R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge.
Utah Administrative Code
Workforce Services
Title R994. Workforce Information and Payment Services
Rule R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits
Current through Bulletin No. 2017-7, April 1, 2017
R994-405 -208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge
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In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in determining
eligibility for benefits.
(1)

Violation of Company Rules.
If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established, benefits
will be denied.
(a)

An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that further
legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or
that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be
reasonable. If a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally
has the responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging
in conduct contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an opportunity to
address those concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must provide
appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply.

(b)

If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract or
collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the
discharge is consistent with the provisions of the contract.

(c)

Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a
claimant was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further
violations may result in a denial of benefits.

(d)

Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of itself,
cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's
ability to maintain necessary discipline.

(e)

Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior warning to
support a disqualification.

(2)

Attendance Violations.
(a)

Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and
productivity. It is the responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work
within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for unjustified
absence or tardiness is disqualifying if the claimant knew enforced attendance
rules were being violated. A discharge for an attendance violation beyond the
claimant's control is generally not disqualifying unless the claimant could
reasonably have given notice or obtained permission consistent with the
employer's rules, but failed to do so.

(b)

In cases of discharge for violations of attendance standards, the claimant's recent
attendance history must be reviewed to determine if the violation is an isolated
incident, or if it demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absence within the claimant's
control. The flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a denial of
benefits even if the last incident is beyond the claimant's control.

(3)

Falsification of Work Record.
The duty of honesty is inherent in any employment relationship. An employee or potential
employee has an obligation to truthfully answer material questions posed by the employer
or potential employer. For purposes of this subsection, material questions are those that
may expose the employer to possible loss, damage or litigation if answered falsely. If false
statements were made as part of the application process, benefits may be denied
regardless of whether the claimant would have been hired if all questions were answered
truthfully.

(4)

Insubordination.
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be followed;
reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; supervisors will be
respected and their authority will not be undermined. In determining when insubordination
becomes disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and legitimate
interests is of major importance. Protesting or expressing general dissatisfaction without
an overt act is not a disregard of the employer's interests. However, provocative remarks
to a superior or vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may constitute
insubordination if it disrupts routine, undermines authority or impairs efficiency. Mere
incompatibility or emphatic insistence or discussion by a claimant, acting in good faith, is
not disqualifying conduct.

(5)

Loss of License.
If the discharge is due to the loss of a required license and the claimant had control over
the circumstances that resulted in the loss, the conduct is generally disqualifying. Harm is
established as the employer would generally be exposed to an unacceptable degree of
risk by allowing an employee to continue to work without a required license. In the
example of a lost driving privilege due to driving under the influence (DUI), knowledge is

established as it is understood by members of the driving public that driving under the
influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and may be punishable by the loss of driving
privileges. Control is established as the claimant made a decision to risk the loss of his or
her license by failing to make other arrangements for transportation.
(6)

Incarceration.
When a claimant engages in illegal activities, it must be recognized that the possibility of
arrest and detention for some period of time exists. It is foreseeable that incarceration will
result in absence from work and possible loss of employment. Generally, a discharge for
failure to report to work because of incarceration due to proven or admitted criminal
conduct is disqualifying.

(7)

Abuse of Drugs and Alcohol.
(a)

The Legislature, under the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, Section 34-38-1 et
seq., has determined the illegal use of drugs and abuse of alcohol creates an
unsafe and unproductive workplace. In balancing the interests of employees,
employers and the welfare of the general public, the Legislature has determined
the fair and equitable testing for drug and alcohol use is a reasonable employment
policy.

(b)

An employer can establish a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under the
Employment Security Act based on testing conducted under the Drug and Alcohol
Testing Act by providing the following information:
(i)

A written policy on drug or alcohol testing consistent with the requirements
of the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act and that was in place at the time the
violation occurred.

(ii)

Reasonable proof and description of the method for communicating the
policy to all employees, including a statement that violation of the policy
may result in discharge.

(iii)

Proof of testing procedures used which would include:
(A) Documentation of sample collection, storage and transportation
procedures.
(B)

Documentation that the results of any screening test for drugs and
alcohol were verified or confirmed by reliable testing methods.

(C) A copy of the verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test report.

(c)

The above documentation shall be admissible as competent evidence under
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence respecting "records of regularly conducted activity," unless determined
otherwise by a court of law.

(d)

A positive alcohol test result shall be considered disqualifying if it shows a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater per 100 milliliters of blood or
210 liters of breath. A blood or breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.08
grams may also be disqualifying if the claimant worked in an occupation governed
by a state or federal law that allowed or required discharge at a lower standard.

(e)

Proof of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result or refusal to
provide a proper test sample is a violation of a reasonable employer rule. The
claimant may be disqualified from the receipt of benefits if his or her separation
was consistent with the employer's written drug and alcohol policy.

(f)
'-..ti

In addition to the drug and alcohol testing provisions above, ineligibility for benefits
under the Employment Security Act may be established through the introduction of
other competent evidence.

Cite as Utah Admin. Code R994-105-208

§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer - Appeals - Board Procedure.
Utah Statutes
Title 1O. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter 3. Municipal Government
Current through 3-28-2017
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer - Appeals - Board -

Procedure

(1)

An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended
without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a)

because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or

(b}

incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or
heads of departments.

(2)

(a)

If an employee other than an employee described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is
discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any disciplinary
reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the final decision
to discharge, suspendwithout pay, or involuntarily transfer to an appeal board or
hearing officer established under Subsection (7).

(b)

If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to
the appeal board or hearing officer.

(3)

(a)

Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the
appeal with the municipal recorder in accordance with procedures established by a
municipalitywithin 10 calendar days after:
(i)

if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal
grievance procedure: or

(ii)

if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.

(b)

(i)

Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder

shall refer a copy of a properly filed appeal to the appeal board or hearing
officer described in Subsection (7).
(ii)

Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board or
hearing officer shall schedule a hearing to take and receive evidence and
fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the reasonfor the
discharge, suspension, or transfer.

(4 )

(a)

(b)

An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(i)

appear in person and be represented by counsel;

(ii)

have a hearing open to the public;

(iii)

confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and

(iv)

examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.

An employee or the municipality may request the hearing described in Subsection
(4 )(a)(ii).

(5)

(a)

(i)

A decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot.

(ii)

The appeal board or the hearing officer shall certify a decision by the appeal
board or hearing officer, respectively, with the recorder no later than 15
days after the day on which the hearing is held, except as provided in
Subsection (5)(a)(iii).

(iii)

For good cause, the appeal board or hearing officer may extend the 15-day
period under Subsection (S)(a)(ii) to a maximum of 60 calendar days, if the
employee and municipality both consent.

viJ

(b)

If the appeal board or hearing officer finds in favor of the employee, the appeal
board or hearing officer shall provide that the employee shall receive:
(i)

the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged or suspended without pay less any amounts the employee
earned from other employment during this period of time; or

(ii)

any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was
transferred to a position of less remuneration.

(6)

(a)

A final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer may be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review.

(b)

A petition under Subsection (6){a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of
the final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer.

(c)

The Court of Appeals' review shall be:
(i)

on the record of the appeal board or hearing officer; and

(ii)

for the purpose of determining if the appeal board or hearing officer abused
its discretion or exceeded its authority.

(7 )

(a)

The method and manner of choosing a hearing officer or the members of the
appeal board, the number of members, the designation of a hearing officer's or
appeal board member's term of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal
and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each
municipality by ordinance.

(b)

For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a councilmayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-mayor Form of Municipal
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.

(8)

This section does not apply to an employee:
(a)

described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2); or

(b)

discharged or transferred to a position with less remuneration if the discharge or
transfer is the result of a layoff, reorganization, or other non-disciplinary reason.

Cite as Utah Code § 10-3-1106
History. Amended by Chapter 321, 2012 General Session, §3, eff. 5/8/2012.
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session
'1L.,'

Rule 24. Briefs.

Utah Court Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Title 5. General Provisions
As amended through March 28, 2017

Rule 24. Briefs
(a)

Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings
and in the order indicated:
(a)(

A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose

1)

judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.

(a}(

A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.

2)
(a)(

A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,

3)

rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
where they are cited.

(a)(

A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

4)
(a)(

A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the

5)

standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)( citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court;

VJ)

5)(

or

A)
(a}( a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the
5)(

trial court.

B)
(a)(

Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose

6)

interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the
provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set
forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11} of this rule.

(a}(

A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the

7)

case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement
of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements
of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record in accordance with paragraph (e} of this rule.

(a)(

Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall

8}

be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief.
It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is
arranged.

(a}(

An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the

9)

appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award.

(a)(

A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

10)
(a)(

An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary

11)

under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately,
the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a
copy of:
(a)( any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
11) cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(A)
(a)( in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appe~ls
11)

opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal

(B)

but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service; and

(a)( those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
11} determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
(C)

fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.

(b}

Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:

(c)

(b )(

a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the

1)

statement of the appellant; or

(b)(

an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the

2)

appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.

Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.

{d)

References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant"
11

and appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
11

employee, "the injured person,' "the taxpayer, 11 etc.
(e)

References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or 11 (g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified,
offered, and received or rejected.

(f)

Length of briefs.
(f)( 1 Type-volume limitation.

)

(f)(

In an appeal involving the legality of a death sentence, a principal brief is

1 )(

acceptable if it contains no more than 28,000 words or if it uses a

A)

monospaced face and 86 contains no more than 2,600 lines of text; and a
reply brief is acceptable if it contains no 87 more than 14,000 words or if it
uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 88 1,300 lines of text.
In all other appeals, a principal brief is acceptable if it contains no more than
14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than
1,300 lines of text; and a reply brief is acceptable if it contains no more than
7,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 650
lines of text.

(f)(

Headings, footnotes and quotations count toward the word and line

1 )(

limitations, but the table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum

B)

containing statutes, rules, regulations or portions of the record as required
by paragraph (a) of this rule do not count toward the word and line
limitations.

(f)(

Certificate of compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(f)(1) must

1)(

include a certificate by the attorney or an unrepresented party that the brief

C)

complies with the type-volume limitation. The person preparing the
certificate may rely on the word or line count of the word processing system
used to prepare the brief. The certificate must state either the number of
words in the brief or the number of lines of monospaced type in the brief.

(f)(2 Page limitation. Unless a brief complies with Rule 24(f)(1 ), a principal briefs shall
)

not exceed 30 pages, and a reply briefs shall not exceed 15 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule.
In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of
briefs.

(g)

Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a

notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs.
(g)(

The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in

1)

the appeal.

{g)(

The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-

2)

Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.

(g)(

The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of

3)

Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief
of Cross-Appellant.

(g)(

The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to

4)

the Brief of Cross-Appellee.

(g)(

Type-volume limitation.

5)

(g)( The appellant's Brief of Appellant is acceptable if it contains no more than
5)(

14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than

A)

1,300 lines of text.

~

(g)( The appellee's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it
5)(

contains no more than 16,500 words or it uses a monospaced face and

B)

contains no more than 1,500 lines of text.

(g)( The appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee is
5)(

acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it uses a

C)

monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text.

(g)( The appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it contains no
5)(

more than half of the type volume specified in Rule 24(g)(5)(A).

D)
(g)(

Certificate of Compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(g)(5) must comply

6)

with Rule 24(f)(1 )(C).

(g)(

Page Limitation. Unless it complies with Rule 24(g)(5) and (6), the appellant's

7)

Brief of Appellant must not exceed 30 pages; the appellee's Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, 35 pages; the appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, 30 pages; and the appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, 15
pages.

(h)

Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the page, word,
or line limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be
briefed, the number of additional pages, words, or lines requested, and the good cause for
granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days prior to the date the brief is due or
seeking three or fewer additional pages, 1,400 or fewer additional words, or 130 or fewer
lines of text need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed within seven
days of the date the brief is due and seeking more than three additional pages, 1,400
additional words, or 130 lines of text shall be accompanied by a copy of the finished brief.
If the motion is granted, the responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional
pages, words, or lines without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.

(i)

Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal,
any number of either may join in a single brief. and any appellant or appellee may adopt
by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.

0)

Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter
setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There

shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within seven
days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k)

Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer.

Cite as Utah. R. App. P. 24

Note:
Advisory Committee Notes

The rule reflects the marshaling requirement articulated in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, which holds
that the failure to marshal is no longer a technical deficiency that will result in default, but is the manner in which an
appellant carries its burden of persuasion when challenging a finding or verdict based upon evidence.
Briefs that do not comply with the technical requirements of this rule are subject to Rule 27(e).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation
of supporting authority.

Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.010 Purpose.
The purpose of annual vacation leave is to allow an employee time to both
mentally and physically refresh himself in order that he be better able to carry out
the duties of his work. To achieve this goal, it is the intent of Vernal City to have
the employees schedule annual vacation leave during the course of his
employment. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15)

Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 5.01.060 Scheduling.
An employee's vacation shall be, as much as possible, scheduled for the

employee's convenience. However, vacations must be scheduled through
Department Heads so as not to interfere seriously with or impair departmental
efficiency. All employees shall submit Request for Leave forms before taking any
vacation. As he deems necessary, a Department Head may require an employee
to use any accrued vacation leave. (Form in appendix pages) (Amended
11/03/2004, Res.2004-15)

Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.030 Causes for
Disciplinary Action.
An employee holding any position with Vernal City may be placed on
probationary status, transferred, demoted, reduced in pay, suspended with or
without pay, or terminated, for any of the following reasons including, but are not
limited to the following:
A. A violation of any of the City Personnel policies and procedures, or any
other administrative policies, as adopted by resolution of the Vernal City
Council;
B. Neglect of duty;
C. Refusal to obey a reasonable order by any supervisor, either written or
verbal;
D. Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties;
E. An act hostile to public service;
F. Falsification or unauthorized alteration of City records;
G. Falsification of employment application;
H. Knowingly marking the time sheet of another employee, authorizing
one's time sheet to be marked by an unauthorized employee, or
unauthorized alteration of a time sheet.
I. Carelessness which affects the safety of personnel;
J. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with fellow
employees on the job, or the public.
K. Theft or removal from the work area or premise without proper
authorization of any City property or that of any employee.
L. Gambling or engaging a lottery at any City work area.
M. Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of
any employee.
N. Deliberately restricting output.
0. Possessing or consuming any alcoholic beverage or unlawfully
manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing or using a controlled
substance in the workplace of Vernal City.
P. Intoxication, or being under the influence of alcohol or prohibitive
drugs, during work hours or in the workplace of Vernal City.
Q. Immoral conduct or indecency affecting job performance or job
effectiveness.
R. Sleeping on the job during work hours.
S. Engaging in conduct that negatively impacts the employee's ability to
perform essential functions of his job.
T. Using, threatening or attempting to use personal or political influence in
an effort to secure special consideration as a City employee.
U. Failure to report to work without notification to the Department Head
unless it is impossible to give such notice.

V. Involvement in a vehicular accident involving a City vehicle, where
negligence has been demonstrated by the employee.
W. Act of dishonesty related to job performance.
X. Misuse of disposed surplus property.
Y. Sexual harassment of employees.
Z. Using profane language.
AA. Displaying insubordinate behavior.
BB. Any other misconduct.
CC. Possession of firearms, weapons or explosives on City owned
property or at the work location without authorization of the City Manager
unless specifically allowed by federal or State law.
DD. Employment discrimination.
EE. Moving traffic violation while operating a City vehicle.
FF.
Violation of the Information Technology Resources provisions of
these policies and procedures.
GG. Violation of local, State or Federal laws.
(Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15)
(Res. 2015-03, Amended, 02/04/2015, Prior Text; Res. 2010-14, Amended,
07/08/2010, Prior Text; Res. 2009-28, Amended, 12/17/2009, Prior Text; Res.
2005-19, Amended, 11/02/2005, Prior Text)

Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.040 Legal and
management review required for formal disciplinary action.
A. Whenever any Department Head, or his designee, feels there is a need for
formal disciplinary action to be taken against a City employee, that Department
Head must contact the City Manager's office prior to taking any other action.
B. A meeting will be held with the Department Head and appropriate
members of his / her department to discuss the action of the employee and the
proposed disciplinary action to be taken in response.
C. Excepting for oral warnings or written reprimands, the City Manager shall
approve all other disciplinary actions of any employee as provided in Section
12.05.01oand 12.05.060 of this Chapter. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15)
(Res. 2012-10, Amended, 05/16/2012, Prior Text; Res. 2005-19, Amended,
11/02/2005, Prior Text)

Vernal City Personnel Manual Section 12.05.065 Types of disciplinary
action.
Informal disciplinacy procedures can include the following:
1. Oral warning. Whenever grounds for disciplinary action exist, and the
department head determines that more severe action is not immediately
necessary, the deficiency demonstrated may be orally communicated to the
employee.
a. A memorandum of the date and content of the oral warning shall be
written by the department head, or designee.
b. This memorandum shall be placed in a separate verbal warning folder in
the personnel department and is not part of the employee's personnel file.
2. Written reprimand. The department head, or designee, may reprimand
employees for employment pedormance related reasons.
a. The department head, or designee, shall furnish the employee with an
employee written reprimand notification setting for the reasons.
b. A copy of the employee written reprimand notification, signed by the
department head, or designee, and the employee, shall be sent to the personnel
department and be placed in the employee's personnel file. If the employee
refuses to sign the form, the department head, or designee, will so state.
B. Formal disciplinary procedures can include the following:
1. Placement on probation. The department head, or his designee, after
approval of the City Manager, may place an employee on a disciplinary probation
status for a time period not to exceed a six (6) month period.
2. Suspension. The department head, or designee, after consultation with
the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter
pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may suspend employees with or
without pay.
3. Demotion or reduction in pay in the same grade. If in the best interest of
both the employee and the City, the department head, or designee, after
consultation with the City Manager and in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may demote or reduce in
the same grade, employees for employment pedormance related reasons.
4. Transfer which may result in reduction in pay. If in the best interest of
both the employee and the City, the department head, or designee, after
consultation with the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may transfer employees,
except a probationary employee, by furnishing the employee with written
employee transfer notification.
5. Termination. The department head, or designee, after consultation with
the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter
pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may request to terminate an
employee. Only the City Manager may approve the termination of an employee.
(Res. 2005-19, Add, 11/02/2005)
A.

